

AD-A277 118



✓

2

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California

DTIC
ELECTE
MAR 16 1994
S F D



12308 94-08442



THESIS

Building Consensus for Strategic Planning and
Implementation for Coast Guard Law Enforcement

by

Jeffrey D. Holmgren and James R. Dolan

December, 1993

Thesis Advisor:

Frank Barrett

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

DTIC QUALITY ASSURED 1

94 3 15 020

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE December 1993		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Building Consensus for Strategic Planning and Implementation for Coast Guard Law Enforcement			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Jeffrey D. Holmgren and James R. Dolan				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE *A	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) This thesis examines the strategic planning and implementation process within the law enforcement missions of the United States Coast Guard. The Coast Guard is a unique federal agency for several reasons. Unlike many federal agencies, it has numerous missions that are not closely related. Coast Guard units are located throughout the United States and the world. There are various other political and organizational pressures that confront the Coast Guard leadership. This thesis looks at the Coast Guard law enforcement organization with an eye towards the changing dynamics that must be dealt with in strategic planning, including the various pressures that specifically affect the Coast Guard's law enforcement mission. Field interviews were conducted to identify themes and problems that relate to law enforcement strategic planning for law enforcement missions. Additionally, a survey was developed based on theme constructs, which was used for quantitative analysis and model development. Based on a literature review, qualitative analysis, model review, and quantitative analysis, we then detail conclusions and recommendations that may improve strategic planning for the law enforcement mission within the Coast Guard and can be applied to many organizations that face multiple missions in a complex environment, including the United States Naval Supply Systems Command.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS strategic planning and implementation, Coast Guard law enforcement, bottoms-up strategic planning, building strategic consensus			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 123	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL	

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Building Consensus for Strategic Planning and Implementation
for Coast Guard Law Enforcement

by

Jeffrey D. Holmgren
Lieutenant Commander, United States Coast Guard
B.S., United States Coast Guard Academy
and

James R. Dolan
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., St. John Fisher College

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of


MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT


from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL


December 1993


Author:



Jeffrey D. Holmgren


James R. Dolan

Approved by:


Frank Barrett, Thesis Advisor


Gail Thomas, Co-advisor


David Whipple, Chairman
Department of Systems Management

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the strategic planning and implementation process within the law enforcement missions of the United States Coast Guard. The Coast Guard is a unique federal agency for several reasons. Unlike many federal agencies, it has numerous missions that are not closely related. Coast Guard units are located throughout the United States and the world. There are various other political and organizational pressures that confront the Coast Guard leadership. This thesis looks at the Coast Guard law enforcement organization with an eye towards the changing dynamics that must be dealt with in strategic planning, including the various pressures that specifically affect the Coast Guard's law enforcement mission.

Field interviews were conducted to identify themes and problems that relate to law enforcement strategic planning for law enforcement missions. Additionally, a survey was developed based on theme constructs, which was used for quantitative analysis and model development. Based on a literature review, qualitative analysis, model review, and quantitative analysis, we then detail conclusions and recommendations that may improve strategic planning for the law enforcement mission within the Coast Guard and can be applied to many organizations that face multiple missions in a complex environment, including the United States Naval Supply Systems Command.

Accession For	
NTIS CRA&I	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By	
Distribution /	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION	1
A.	BACKGROUND	1
B.	PURPOSE	1
C.	RESEARCH METHOD	2
D.	RESEARCH QUESTIONS	3
E.	ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS	4
II.	THE COAST GUARD - HISTORY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT . . .	5
A.	HISTORY	5
B.	LAW ENFORCEMENT OVERVIEW	7
C.	LAW ENFORCEMENT MISSIONS AND METHODS	8
D.	LAW ENFORCEMENT GOALS	13
E.	CURRENT LAW ENFORCEMENT TRENDS	15
F.	RESOURCES NEEDED FOR COAST GUARD LAW ENFORCEMENT AND STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT MISSIONS	16
III.	STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT LITERATURE REVIEW	18
A.	INTRODUCTION	18
B.	CONSENSUS DISCUSSION	19
C.	STRATEGIC UNDERSTANDING AND COMMITMENT	20
D.	ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF CONSENSUS	22
E.	LEVELS OF CONSENSUS	23
F.	CONSENSUS CONTENT AND SCOPE	25
G.	CONSENSUS OVERVIEW	26

H.	MIDDLE MANAGEMENT'S ROLE IN CONSENSUS	26
I.	STRATEGIC PLANNING DISCUSSION	31
IV.	QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS	36
A.	INTRODUCTION	36
B.	THE COAST GUARD'S MULTI-MISSION RESPONSIBILITY OVERVIEW	36
C.	COAST GUARD MISSIONS	37
D.	REGIONAL MISSION DIVERSITY	40
E.	ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE	41
F.	COAST GUARD HEADQUARTERS, OPERATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIVISION	43
G.	STRATEGIC PLANNING GOALS	44
H.	POLITICAL INFLUENCE	46
I.	CHANGING MISSION EMPHASIS	48
J.	INTERVIEW DATA	49
V.	QUANTITATIVE METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS	72
A.	SURVEY DESIGN	72
B.	SURVEY ADMINISTRATION	73
C.	STATISTICAL DATA ANALYSIS	74
D.	DATA REDUCTION	75
E.	MODEL TO BE INVESTIGATED	80
F.	RESULTS	81
G.	INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS	83
H.	OVERALL SURVEY RESULTS	95
VI.	CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	96
A.	FINDINGS BY MODEL	96
B.	FINDINGS BY DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS	97

C. FINDINGS BY CONSTRUCT	99
D. FINDINGS BY QUESTION	101
E. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS	104
F. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH	105
APPENDIX A: COAST GUARD LAW ENFORCEMENT SURVEY	107
APPENDIX B: QUESTION BY TOTAL SURVEY RESPONDENTS MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS ASCENDING MEAN ORDERED	112
LIST OF REFERENCES	114
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	116

I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

The Operational Law Enforcement Division (G-OLE) at Coast Guard Headquarters has been aware for some time that strategic planning for the law enforcement missions has been limited in its success. The Plans and Policy Branch (G-OLE-1) has articulated its desire to improve strategic planning mainly in terms of improving the communication of mission goals and the assessment of mission execution. In this light, (G-OLE-1) expressed the need for improving the Coast Guard's measures of effectiveness for the law enforcement missions. This thesis focuses on the various factors and constraints that are related to the planning and execution of Coast Guard law enforcement missions.

B. PURPOSE

The purpose of this thesis is to first identify the factors and constraints that are related to strategic planning for the Coast Guard law enforcement missions. We wish to provide an analysis of interview and survey data that will identify symptoms of various strategic planning problems. Once these themes are identified we will recommend possible courses of action the Coast Guard can take to improve the strategic planning process for the law enforcement mission.

Our research should give (G-OLE-1) an initial amount of data and information whereby they will be able to draw additional conclusions to bring about their own management actions. Finally this thesis can be the impetus for future research on this subject so that strategic planning will continually improve in the law enforcement missions.

C. RESEARCH METHOD

A literature review was done to identify pertinent research on strategic planning that had been done by various authors. Semi-structured interviews were conducted of Coast Guard personnel at various organizational levels and geographic locations as per the following:

UNIT TYPE	ATLANTIC AREA	PACIFIC AREA	TOTAL
AREA	---	4	4
DISTRICT	3	2	5
GROUP	3	2	5
STATION	5	3	8
AIRSTA	4	2	4
WHEC	1	3	4
WMEC	4	2	6
WPB	3	3	6
OTHER	3	---	3
TOTAL	24	21	45

The personnel interviewed were all assigned to Coast Guard units that were involved in the law enforcement mission to some degree. Constructs and themes were generated from the interview data to do qualitative analysis and to develop a survey.

A survey was mailed to different Coast Guard units throughout the organization as follows with results being quantitatively analyzed:

UNIT TYPE	ATLANTIC AREA	PACIFIC AREA	TOTAL
AREA	3	3	6
DISTRICT	9	9	18
GROUP	39	37	76
STATION	25	22	47
AIRSTA	11	10	21
WHEC	11	11	22
WMEC	16	15	31
WFB	21	21	42
TOTAL	135	130	265

The literature review qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis were then integrated to develop conclusions so that recommendations could then be made.

D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The principal research question is how strategic planning for the Coast Guard law enforcement mission can be improved.

The first subsidiary question addresses various constraints and factors that are involved in the planning and execution of the law enforcement missions. The other subsidiary question is how to improve strategic communications for the Coast Guard law enforcement mission.

E. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS

Chapter II of this thesis gives a historical perspective of the Coast Guard as an organization. It also serves to describe the various law enforcement missions of the Coast Guard.

Chapter III is a literature review of relevant material focusing on consensus building in strategic planning.

Chapter IV is a qualitative analysis of interview data collected for this thesis.

Chapter V is a quantitative analysis of the survey data collected for this thesis.

Chapter VI contains conclusions and recommendations based on the analysis of the integrated data and the literature review.

II. THE COAST GUARD - HISTORY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

A. HISTORY

The history of the United States Coast Guard is a proud one, with law enforcement missions taking center stage of importance to the nation with respect to civil defense. Some important dates are discussed below, which show the development of the Coast Guard's major missions, with emphasis on law enforcement:

- 1789 - The Revenue Act of 1789 was passed, which enabled the new nation to collect tariffs on goods shipped into the country, to help offset the large debt from the Revolutionary War.
- 1791 - Congress authorized the establishment and support of ten cutters for the purpose of enforcing custom laws. This was the first mention of legal authority for the new service, then called the Revenue Service.
- 1793 - The Coasting and Fishing Act of 1793 was passed, which limited coastal fishing off the United States to U.S. vessels. This law lacked enforcement though, as Revenue Service vessels were only able to stop violators and escort them to waters outside a three mile limit.
- 1799 - Congress authorized Revenue Service Cutters to fire at vessels that refused to 'heave to' when ordered to do so. Also in this year, the Revenue Service saw its first military action, when it became involved in the undeclared war with France.
- 1831 - The Revenue Service became involved in the life saving area of operations.
- 1837 - Congress directed the Revenue Service to aid mariners in distress during its law enforcement patrols.

- 1890 - A Revenue Service Cutter seized a vessel for transporting opium. This was the first drug related seizure; before this time, drugs were of more interest to the Coast Guard as a taxable item.
- 1906 - The Alien Fishing Act was enacted, which prohibited foreign vessels from fishing commercially in Alaskan waters.
- 1911 - The Fur Seal Convention of 1911, and the Fur Seal Act of 1912, limited the catching of such animals as the sea otter and other fur bearing sea creatures, which lived in and around Alaskan waters.
- 1915 - The Revenue Service was merged with the Life Saving Service, creating the U.S. Coast Guard. The Life Saving Service had consisted of beach patrols to aid swimmers and warn vessels sailing into danger.
- 1920 - The Volstead Act brought about prohibition. The Coast Guard was directed to ensure that no liquor was smuggled into the nation via waterways. This turned out to be very difficult for the Coast Guard to enforce, as was evident from the great number of successful smuggling stories.
- 1933 - Prohibition ended.
- 1939 - The Coast Guard acquired responsibility for aids to navigation, when the Lighthouse Service was transferred from the Commerce Department to the Treasury Department.
- 1942 - The Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation shifted from the Commerce Department to the Treasury Department. These duties were absorbed by the Coast Guard, and included supervising ship construction and the licensing of vessel operators.
- 1950 - The Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Act passed, and was the first law concerned with conservation of fish, although it applied only to U.S. vessels until 1971.
- 1964 - The Bartlett Act prescribed civil and criminal penalties for foreign vessels fishing within three miles of any U.S. coast. This three mile limit was known as the contiguous fishing zone, and was later expanded to nine and then twelve miles.
- 1967 - The Coast Guard became part of the Department of Transportation.

- 1976 - The Fishery Conservation and Management Act (FMCA) was enacted, expanding United States control over fishing areas extending two hundred miles from the coast. This was a very complicated and misunderstood law, which did not prohibit foreign fishing in this area, but limited the types and amounts of fish which could be caught, and established certain standard criteria for fishing, such as net size, and other miscellaneous criteria.
- 1980 - The Coast Guard started to get involved regularly in Alien Migration Interdiction Operations (AMIO).

B. LAW ENFORCEMENT OVERVIEW

The above historical chronology shows how Coast Guard missions have evolved into four major program areas: Maritime Law Enforcement, Marine Safety, Environmental Protection and National Security. While the Coast Guard budget has grown from \$1.69 billion in 1984 to \$2.24 billion in 1990, Maritime Law Enforcement funding has grown from 27.3% to 34.7% of the budget during this same time period; while other missions have each decreased slightly as a percentage of the budget over this same time period. The Coast Guard's Maritime Law Enforcement activities fall into two main categories: general law enforcement and enforcement of conservation regulations. The general law enforcer program involves marine interdiction of controlled substances, enforcement of immigration laws, recreational boating regulations and other criminal activities such as vessel hijackings. Enforcement of conservation regulations concerns protection of fisheries and marine living resources.

C. LAW ENFORCEMENT MISSIONS AND METHODS

1. Maritime Drug Interdiction

During the 1970s, the primary drug being smuggled into the U.S. was marijuana, with the primary source being Mexico, via over land routes. Expanded enforcement activities by both the U.S. and Mexico shifted the primary source of drugs to Colombia. By the early 1980s, many smugglers had started to bring bulk contraband to the U.S. by sea routes. Smuggling drugs by sea into the U.S. involves Coast Guard jurisdiction, and as a result, the Coast Guard expanded its general law enforcement activities to halt the new inflow of illegal drugs by sea. From 1973 - 1980, the number of tons of marijuana seized by the Coast Guard, increased from 8 to 1247.

Congressional action during the early 1980s strengthened the Coast Guard's maritime drug interdiction efforts. Congress passed laws that amended the elements of proof necessary to prosecute trafficking cases, and expanded the jurisdiction over those cases associated with smugglers. Congress also passed laws allowing the Department of Defense (DOD) to assist in general law enforcement efforts.

Coast Guard drug seizures occur as a result of one of three operations. The first type of seizure occurs while executing another mission. For example, drug smugglers may request assistance during an emergency condition, and when the Coast Guard arrives on the scene, the drugs are discovered and seized. The second type of seizure occurs from information

gained by investigative work. The Coast Guard receives such information from other law enforcement agencies or private citizens. During this type of seizure, before the vessel enters U.S. waters, the Coast Guard possesses all knowledge necessary to intercept and seize the drug carrying vessel. The third type of seizure results from Coast Guard planes' and ships' patrol efforts. The planes and ships search for smugglers, and then identify, board and inspect the most suspicious vessels. Patrol efforts like this, produce the most seizures.

The East Coast maritime drug interdiction efforts produce significantly more seizures than the West Coast drug interdiction efforts. The East Coast maritime smuggler routes pass through identified choke points. Coast Guard ships and planes concentrate on those particular choke points, thus attaining high interdiction rates. No particular choke points exist on the U.S. West Coast due to the nature of land masses in the Pacific Ocean. Consequently, fewer drug interdiction seizures occur on the West Coast. Although no choke points exist on the West Coast, the Coast Guard does expend much effort to identify suspicious activity. Numerous aircraft perform surveillance flights, and ships patrol the sea lanes, documenting all vessel sightings. These efforts produce approximately 22,000 West Coast vessel sightings per year.

The Coast Guard uses a main frame computer to store and categorize both West and East Coast sightings. Sightings

gathered from patrols may contain a vessel with a history of drug smuggling. The computer will run a check of vessel names for known drug involvement history. If the vessel possesses a drug involvement history, the Coast Guard uses covert surveillance to uncover any illegal activity.

2. Fishery Conservation

Concern over exploitation of fish stocks off U.S. Coasts prompted enactment of the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976. Enforcement of this act requires the Coast Guard to patrol fisheries within a 200 mile conservation zone of the U.S. coast. The law allows Coast Guard patrol vessels to board any fishing vessel to ensure compliance with the 1976 Magnuson law.

The U.S. Coast Guard monitors all fishing vessels within the 200 mile U.S. coastal fishing zone. All foreign fishing vessels undergo periodic inspections by the Coast Guard. U.S. domestic vessels receive inspections by local state authorities in port. Historically, there has been a higher rate of violations by foreign fishing vessels, and consequently, the Coast Guard concentrates their efforts in monitoring the foreign fishing fleet.

National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) places U.S. observers on 20% of the foreign fishing fleet, while Congress desires 100% coverage. The objective of 100% coverage is that foreign fishermen will hesitate to mis-report or under report their catch with an agent onboard. The Alaskan fishing waters

involve 92% of all foreign fishing conducted in the United States. Operational units based in Kodiak, Alaska, maintain surveillance on the foreign fishing fleet in Alaskan waters. Surveillance of the foreign fishing fleet relies primarily on reports or sightings by U.S. Coast Guard planes and ships. Daily flights by Coast Guard C130s report the positions of the foreign fishing vessels. Coast Guard ships patrolling the area note the positions and conduct periodic boardings.

Seasonal high concentrations involve as many as 300 foreign fishing vessels in Alaskan waters. Personnel at the U.S. Coast Guard Air Station Kodiak, manually plot the positions of each foreign fishing vessel on a wall map, producing an effective graphical tool, even though the plotting consumes a lot of time and effort.

3. Immigration

The Coast Guard's involvement in controlling illegal alien activity by sea, shows historic involvement dating back to slave trade during the 1810s, but until April 1980, the Coast Guard had only minor involvement in stemming illegal immigration. Between April and September 1980, a massive illegal Cuban immigration to the U.S. by sea occurred. Approximately 125,000 Cuban aliens departed Cuba for the U.S. The Coast Guard provided search and rescue support to the poorly outfitted immigrants. During the Cuban immigration, the Coast Guard received direction to forcefully prevent U.S. ships from going to Cuba to bring back illegal aliens.

Current trends indicate increased law enforcement efforts in stemming the flow of illegal aliens. From 1981 - 1991, the total number of illegal aliens handled by the Coast Guard, grew from approximately 200 to over 13,000.

Due to the evolving growth of illegal aliens coming to the U.S. by sea, methods of law enforcement are also evolving and being handled as individual events occur.

4. Other Law Enforcement Activities

Activities that concern the U.S. Coast Guard, but occur on an infrequent basis, include investigating vessel hijackings, reducing fishing gear losses, and preventing illegal civil craft loitering. The Coast Guard investigates and prosecutes all known or suspected vessel thefts or hijackings occurring in federal jurisdictions. The Coast Guard's operational commitments include record keeping, intelligence gathering, information dissemination, and surveillance.

The Coast Guard goal is to prevent or minimize damage to marine fishing gear. Most damage occurs as a result of interference between fixed and mobile gear users. The duties of the Coast Guard involve plotting the position of the fishing gear and disseminating this information through marine broadcasts.

Various maritime danger areas pose threats to civil craft. Danger areas include those DOD designated weapons testing zones. The Coast Guard's function includes informing

vessel operators of the status of various danger areas. The Coast Guard handles other law enforcement activities as the individual events occur.

D. LAW ENFORCEMENT GOALS

1. Maritime Drug Interdiction

The Coast Guard's largest efforts in the smuggling domain involve narcotics trafficking into the United States. Although concern exists over the smuggling of other goods in and out of the U.S., the main thrust has been narcotics. The Coast Guard's long term goal with respect to drugs is:

- Detect or deter 75% of the violations of federal laws and international agreements relating to illicit trafficking in narcotics and psychotropic substances.
- Cooperate with other agencies engaged in maritime law enforcement in those areas for which the Coast Guard shares statutory responsibility or has enforcement authority.

It has been estimated that the Coast Guard is successful in preventing from 5% to 15% of the amount of marijuana illegally entering the U.S. through waterways. Even smaller percentages are estimated for other smuggled goods. The 75% goal appears very optimistic in light of these statistics.

Some Coast Guard law enforcement personnel feel that a more realistic and less quantitative goal may be to increase effectiveness of efforts without increasing operational resources. In other words, instead of basing the goal on a percentage of an unknown number, the goal should be to

increase the number of violators caught. Another major problem the Coast Guard is now in the process of resolving is the historical lack of integration with other agencies involved in counter-narcotics law enforcement, such as U.S. Customs, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

2. Fisheries

The Coast Guard long term goals for fisheries are as follows:

- Detect or deter 95% of the foreign violations of laws and treaties involving fisheries.
- Detect or deter domestic violations of laws and treaties involving fisheries.
- Provide support for other agencies which share statutory responsibilities with the Coast Guard regarding fishery law enforcement.

The overriding law (the FMCA) is relatively new and is not completely understood by all the foreign fishermen working in U.S. controlled waters. This law, in conjunction with other fishing regulations, is very complicated and detailed. Also, the fact that this mission must integrate the efforts of the Coast Guard and National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), and with the ocean coverage area being so immense, make this 95% goal very ambitious.

3. Alien Immigration and Other Goals

The Coast Guard goal for alien immigration and other law enforcement missions, is stated in very general terms, as follows:

- Detect or deter an optimum level of violations of federal laws and treaties other than those related to drugs, fisheries, non-living resources, or those pertaining to other Coast Guard programs.

Due to the increasing prominence of alien migration cases into the U.S., and the fact that this mission must be integrated with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the National Security Council (NSC), the "optimum" cited as a goal has been very hard to define and achieve. Also, due to the multi-dimensional nature of other law enforcement missions, "optimum" again has been hard to define and achieve.

E. CURRENT LAW ENFORCEMENT TRENDS

Late in 1991, the Coast Guard conducted a huge law enforcement and search and rescue operation in response to the seaborne migration of thousands of Haitians. This pace has been kept steady through 1993. During this same time period, the Coast Guard increased its fisheries enforcement activities, and continued high tempo operations at sea. The Fiscal Year 1991 Coast Guard budget was \$3.41 billion. When the percentages of operating expenses in FY 1986 are compared to those of FY 1991, there is a subtle, yet significant shift in the funding emphasis among major Coast Guard programs. Since 1986, the share of the budget devoted to search and rescue and aids to navigation had declined, marine safety and marine environmental protection programs had shown modest growth, while the most significant growth was in marine law

enforcement, making clear the continuing emphasis that the Coast Guard places on the law enforcement mission. This trend has continued into 1993.

F. RESOURCES NEEDED FOR COAST GUARD LAW ENFORCEMENT AND STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT MISSIONS

An Operating Program Plan for any given fiscal year describes the required resources needed for the Coast Guard's law enforcement mission, and notes that the Coast Guard possesses insufficient resources to meet all of its law enforcement objectives. Even though funding has grown in this area, the above discussion was designed to show just how much the law enforcement missions have grown historically. The discussion also showed, not only that the law enforcement missions are many, but that they are often complicated missions, and involve much integration with other federal law enforcement agencies. With these complications in mind, is there a way to optimize Coast Guard law enforcement effectiveness, subject to limited resource constraints?

In this thesis, we will identify and analyze the Coast Guard law enforcement policy formulation process, and the strategic planning and implementation processes within the Coast Guard law enforcement community. We will then look at law enforcement execution at the operational level to determine if the policy- strategy-execution process of Coast Guard law enforcement is optimizing effectiveness subject to limited resources; if not, why not, and how can this process

be improved upon? In the next chapter, we look at a strategic planning models and thinking that is somewhat new to management literature.

III. STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT LITERATURE REVIEW

A. INTRODUCTION

The ultimate goal of this thesis is to identify methods and means by which the Coast Guard can improve the strategic planning process in its law enforcement mission. Literature will be reviewed in this chapter to assist in this task. Strategy formulation has traditionally been considered a task for upper-level management to perform, the notion being that managers think and workers perform tasks. Recent research indicates that effective strategy development and implementation requires a departure from this traditional concept. Indeed the gulf between strategies conceived by top management and awareness at lower levels has been called the "implementation gap", and evidence suggests that it is widening. For example, a Booz-Allen survey of Fortune 500 top executives reports that only a quarter of them believe strategy implementation is consistent with strategy development in their own companies. Unsuccessful execution of strategy is caused by middle and operating level managers who are either ill-informed or unsupportive of the chosen direction. Successful execution, on the other hand, means managers acting on a common understanding and common commitment. We call this combination of collective heart and mind "strategic consensus".

B. CONSENSUS DISCUSSION

Consensus is a critical factor for improved strategy development and implementation. Shaping consensus is an effective approach to forming strategy. The important thing is for top and middle-level managers to recognize problems with consensus as causes of the implementation gap. For most, this will be a new way of thinking about strategy. Consensus building has been an important issue in management research for a long time. Writings concerned with participative management and other approaches to creating agreement have received renewed interest in light of the special attention which has been paid to Japanese management techniques in which consensus building appears to play an essential part.

Nielson developed an approach which, under a given set of conditions, may be used to facilitate consensus decision making. He recommended its use to (a) diminish fears of contributors to a strategic plan lest special interest goals or needs not be satisfied; (b) obtain support when power cannot be used; (c) facilitate swift implementation; (d) meet requirements established by internal governance policies or external legal agencies. (Nielson, 1981)

In his article Dess cites 12 various research efforts that examine organizational consensus from different perspectives. (Dess, 1987) The research by Floyd and Wooldridge provides us with the definition of strategic consensus that best fits our

aims. They define strategic consensus as agreement among top, middle- and operating-level managers on the fundamental priorities of the organization. This agreement shows itself in the actual decisions taken by managers, and its strength can be assessed along both cognitive and emotional dimensions. On the cognitive side, lack of consensus is created by managers who don't share a common perception of what the strategy means and who, therefore, pull in different directions. Shared understanding should be probed at a deep and specific level to determine whether managerial thinking is truly "in sync". On the other side of consensus, unless managers feel some degree of commitment to a strategy, their actions are half-hearted, even when they're fully informed. In general, strategic commitment depends on: (1) how the contemplated strategy fits with what managers perceive as the interest of the organization and (2) how it fits with the managers' own, personal self-interests. (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992)

C. STRATEGIC UNDERSTANDING AND COMMITMENT

The "understanding" part of consensus is described by Floyd as the cognitive half of consensus. (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992) Reid gives his slant on this topic by bringing out the notion of strategic thinking. The exercise of strategic planning must not be merely an exercise in report generation but must also include a measure of strategic

thinking. The idea is to have members of an organization constantly view day-to-day operations and decisions through a strategic "lens". Rather than seeing strategic planning as a separate or non-routine function, it can be a part of an organization's culture. (Reid, 1989)

The emotional dimension of consensus is called commitment by Floyd. (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992) Reid stresses the importance of top level management first showing their commitment to strategic planning. Strategy can be formulated either with or without written documents, but it is unlikely that genuine commitment could be won for any plan which is not committed to paper. (Reid, 1989) This is especially true in complex organizations where decision-making is often collective. We recall experiences in our organizations when upper level management merely paid lip service to long term planning.

Furthermore, if management is to overcome this problem of obtaining a consensus they must begin by spending sufficient time on the issue of creating it, yet time commitments for this kind of "abstract" issue are very difficult to win. For this reason some structure is required...it was the experience of management in those companies which were using the "group commitment" approach, that once having invested the initial "difficult" time in developing and communicating the mission statement, specific functional strategies were much easier to develop and to gain agreement upon.

The idea of commitment should not be passed over lightly as an optional goal of top management. Middle managers with low or negative commitment to the strategies formulated by senior management create significant obstacles to effective implementation. Middle managers are motivated more by their perceived self-interest than by the organizational interest unless they coincide; so the possibility of divergence between the self-interest of middle managers, and organization interest (as perceived by senior management), makes the management of those processes that create middle management commitment a necessary prerequisite for effective strategy implementation.

D. ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS OF CONSENSUS

Thus far we have tried to define strategic consensus for the purposes of this thesis as being made of two components - understanding and commitment. The environment that an organization operates in is a factor to consider when studying strategic consensus. When environmental munificence is low, the opportunity to build organizational slack also is low and the need for consensus on organizational objectives and competitive methods increases. There has been a great deal of conceptual confusion about organizational slack, and little effort has been directed toward operationalizing the concept. This perspective provides a suitable definition:

Organizational slack is that cushion of actual or potential resources which allows an organization to adapt

successfully to internal pressures for adjustment, or to external pressures for changes in policy, as well as to initiate changes in strategy with respect to the external environment.


When slack is low, the firm is concerned with conserving resources. Consequently, strategic choices are constrained and the organization is less able to pursue divergent ends and means for achieving those ends. We believe it will be important to explore the environmental ramifications for the Coast Guard as an organization, particularly in light of its multi-mission responsibilities that can change fairly rapidly with the political winds.

E. LEVELS OF CONSENSUS

After looking at environmental aspects of consensus, we will now look at levels of consensus. Understanding the various levels of consensus is important to management because it becomes a perspective that management can use in developing and implementing strategy. Floyd provides us with a useful way to frame this discussion about levels of consensus.

Combining the cognitive and emotional dimensions of consensus as in Figure 3-1 results in four general possibilities. When managers have both a common understanding and a common commitment to strategy, **strong consensus** exists. If managers are highly committed to "something" but do not share an understanding about what that "something" is, they are well-intentioned but ill-informed. We call this level of consensus **blind devotion**. If managers share an understanding

of strategy but are not committed to it, they are well informed about the strategy but are not committed to it; they are well informed but unwilling to act. We call this condition **informed skepticism**. Finally, when neither shared understanding nor commitment is high, **weak consensus** exists. (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992)



All four levels of consensus can be appropriate or inappropriate, depending on the situation. Strong consensus is good when the chosen strategy works and the business environment is relatively stable. But, what if something in the competitive arena shifts? Continued allegiance to a well

understood course of action can inhibit organizational responsiveness by preventing managers from seeing the need for change.

F. CONSENSUS CONTENT AND SCOPE

Consensus content and scope are the final aspects of strategic consensus that are important to this general discussion. First, the content of consensus describes what managers agree about, and this includes environmental conditions, organizational goals and strategic methods. Agreement on one doesn't necessarily imply agreement on another. Consensus on overall goals, for example, doesn't guarantee agreement about a specific course of action, and in other cases, managers reach consensus about what to do without agreeing on an overall goal.

Second, the scope of consensus distinguishes who the consensus is among. For strategy, the tendency is to think exclusively in terms of top management, but this presumes they fully comprehend the situation and know what needs to be done. In complex or changing environments, individuals rarely appreciate all the intricacies of the situation, and organizations benefit from the variety of viewpoints represented by middle and operating-level managers. Unless they understand the strategic context, however, lower-level managers are unable to recognize significant events, offer sound advice, or propose good options.


G. CONSENSUS OVERVIEW

So far we have tried to show that consensus is a critical factor in both the **development** and **implementation** of strategy. If consensus exists then strategy can be developed more effectively because input from those closest to the actual operations of the organization can be infused. Strategy implementation becomes more likely to succeed when there is consensus. Clearly when members of an organization take part in developing a strategy, understand the strategy, and are committed to it, the implementation of strategy can become a reality.

We have also described the effect the **environment** has on organizational strategic consensus. Out of diverse environments and situations can come different **levels** of consensus. In addition, consensus **content** and **scope** help characterize its role in strategy. Figure 3-2 is a skeleton outline to bring together the themes discussed thus far concerning consensus. (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992)

H. MIDDLE MANAGEMENT'S ROLE IN CONSENSUS

Hopefully at this point the broad definitions of themes pertaining to consensus are clear. We next will review the literature on the subject of middle management involvement in strategy. We will want to define who we consider middle managers to be, and explain the importance of middle management's role in strategy development and implementation.



One basis for defining who middle managers are is that of the "linking pin". Here, a superior in one group is a subordinate in the next, and so on, throughout the organization. As participants in multiple, vertically related groups, "linking pins" coordinate top and operating-level activities. Conceptually therefore, middle management can be defined as the coordination of an organizational unit's day-to-day activities with the activities of vertically related groups. As "linking pins", middle managers take actions that have both upward and downward influences on strategy formation. Upward influence affects top management's view of organizational circumstances and/or the alternative strategies under consideration. Middle management's downward influence, on the other hand, affects the alignment of organizational arrangements within the strategic context.


With this general definition of who middle managers are, we can move forward and discuss how important their influence is in an organization. Middle management occupies a key position; it is equipped with the ability to combine strategic macro (context-free) information and hands-on micro (context-specific) information. In other words, middle-management is in a position to forge the organizational link between deductive and inductive management. Middle management is able to most effectively eliminate the noise, fluctuation, and chaos within an organization's information creation structure by serving as the starting point for action to be taken by upper and lower levels. Therefore, middle managers are also able to serve as the agent for change in the organization's self-renewal process.

Other literature places additional importance on the role of middle management. Floyd's other research on the role of middle management in strategic planning takes on three related implications. First, the involvement of middle managers should be substantive rather than nominal. That is, the purpose of increasing strategic involvement should be to improve the quality of decisions, not to facilitate implementation. Second, top management should clearly define the strategic context. Interviews performed in various organizations revealed that middle managers expected top management direction, but often felt that they were in a better position to initiate and assess alternative courses of

action. Finally, top management should expect middle-level managers to question strategic decisions. The results show no relationship between middle management consensus on strategy and organizational performance. Apparently, substantive involvement can be achieved best in organizational contexts where individuals are comfortable critically examining strategic decisions. (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1990)

Floyd elaborates in more detail on the role of middle management in a different article. On the one hand, strategy is a change process and requires divergent ideas that, if acted upon, alter the organization's concept of strategy. On the other hand, strategy is an "integrated pattern" and requires ideas that coordinate dissimilar activities and support a coherent direction. Although few ideas are purely divergent or integrative, recognizing these two as poles of a continuum, provides an appealing basis for classifying middle management's cognitive contributions. As shown in Figure 3-3, combining action and cognition along these lines results in four types of middle management strategic involvement. Championing alternatives and synthesizing information represent upward forms of involvement, while facilitating adaptability and implementing deliberate strategy are downward terms. (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992)

The preceding discussion about middle management's strategic role was primarily focused on strategy development. Later we will look at implementation more closely. Top



management can look to middle management as a resource for information that can provide an insertion of reality into strategy. Top management creates a vision or dream and middle management creates and implements concrete concepts to solve and transcend the contradictions arising from gaps between what exists at the moment and what management hopes to create. In other words, top management creates an overall theory and tests it empirically within the framework of the entire organization.

We want to continue to move towards the ultimate goal of improving the strategic planning process for Coast Guard law enforcement. In so doing, it has been made clear by various researchers that middle management can be a first string player in strategy development. Figure 3-4 gives a brief summary outline of middle management's strategic involvement.

Middle Management Strategic Involvement

Linking Pin for Information Creation

Upward & Downward Influence

Behavioral & Cognitive Influence

Figure 3-4

I. STRATEGIC PLANNING DISCUSSION

An emerging body of research indicates the need to stop considering strategic planning as an infrequent exercise. A major complication is that those involved in strategic planning customarily belong to one of two groups - the professional planner and the line manager. The solution requires that planning should be a function in which line managers engage; it should be part of a holistic management approach. However, the reality is that strategic planning is frequently a sterile process, one which is oriented merely to the production of documents, the existence of which frequently fails to result in any meaningful change in the behavior of organizations.

Floyd also recognized that strategic planning usually takes the form of disjointed exercises. Research suggests that high levels of shared understanding are built from direct exposure to strategic priorities. (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992) This means establishing a conversation about strategy across management levels and functions. As managers make proposals,

offer alternatives, or question judgements, they become more aware of one another's priorities, and the level of shared understanding deepens. In the process, top management's original intentions evolve to accommodate the inputs of middle and operating levels. Strategy making is a dynamic, continuous phenomena, and to understand it, managers at many levels must be engaged first-hand in the thought process.

We now look to what the literature can show us about how to change strategic planning from something done only in emergencies to a continuous process. Since planning, in particular strategic planning, is often a sterile process of nothing more than a veneer overlaid across day-to-day operations, the question remains as to how new life can be injected? The results of this study suggest that to make the planning process live and seem relevant to all it is necessary to:

1. achieve permeation of planning effort;
2. make planning a continuous process;
3. stimulate strategic thinking.

Figures 3-5, 3-6 and 3-7 below outline the ways to operationalize strategic planning as proposed by Reid. (Reid, 1989)

In concluding his research Reid offers some poignant thoughts. The benefits of strategic planning are often nullified, unless the process can be totally integrated with the organizational way of life. Continuity and inseparability

Achieving Permeation

- > Stimulate continuous participation in the planning process of all those who are capable of contributing..
- > Use the team briefing approach.
- > Translate strategic analysis into meaningful terms among peers.

Figure 3-5

Making Planning A Continuous Process

- > Establish operating philosophies
 - Devote time and intellectual resources to formulating the mission
 - Understand the environment and identify new arenas of opportunity
 - Establish qualitative goals in the light of the competitive situation
- > Seek to position the business to take advantage of opportunities
- > Commit to achieve strategic objectives
 - Translate aspirational goals into objectives which enable measurement
- > Review and Control
 - Accord planning a higher importance ranking

Figure 3-6

with the execution process are critical factors. (Reid, 1989)

This study has identified that only in a few cases is strategic planning a live process within organizations. In fact many organizations frequently fail to extract as much benefit from the process as they could. Much more intellectual effort could be generated by the key people in organizations, and much more effective use could be made of

Stimulating Strategic Thinking

- > Strategic planning process should lead to strategic thinking
- > Highlight the importance of strategic thinking
 - Make adjustments to the organizational climate
 - Introduce objectives for producing actionable ideas
- > Rewarding strategic thinking and removing the fear of penalization

Figure 3-7

the data at hand. By demonstrating a genuine commitment to the principles of strategic planning, and stimulating thinking across a wider boundary, better organizational positionings would result, which would offer a long-term benefit. To make this improvement is extremely difficult. Frequently the commitment and energy does not exist in organizations. In fact it requires a great deal of commitment. Concerted efforts must be made to prime and fine-tune the organization to harness the energies of those capable of contribution. Since managers are often suspicious of the fickleness and genuineness of those above them, senior management must be patient. Commitment must be demonstrated consistently if the change is to be pervasive and effective.

Figure 3-8 serves as a useful tool to bring together some significant points about consensus. (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992) With these ideas in mind, the next chapter will provide a qualitative analysis of these three areas: a) Coast Guard organizational issues, b) law enforcement strategic planning, and c) field interview data.

Shaping Consensus

- > Managing the process by recognizing problems with consensus as causes of poor strategy implementation.
- > Examine the strategic context - determine appropriate level & form of consensus
- > Assess consensus by gathering data and producing consensus maps
- > Identify the gaps in the strategy implementation
- > Work to close the gap
 - Improving understanding by increasing the quality of strategic conversations
 - Enhancing commitment by realigning rewards, systems and structures

* * * * *

If daily priorities are not consistent with strategy, then in what sense has the strategy been implemented? If the people don't know or care about the strategic priorities, what governs their actions?

Figure 3-8

IV. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

A. INTRODUCTION

The Coast Guard faces various organizational constraints and pressures. The following list offers a framework for readers to grasp some the challenges that are inherent in managing the Coast Guard's activities.

- Multiple mission responsibility
- Geographic/regional mission diversity
- Organizational structure
- Top leadership agendas
- External organizational influences

A discussion of the above listed topics will come first. Then an analysis of the interview data will follow to reveal the real life perceptions of Coast Guard members at all levels of the organization.

B. THE COAST GUARD'S MULTI-MISSION RESPONSIBILITY OVERVIEW

The history of the U.S. Coast Guard is as diverse as it is long, spanning more than 200 years. In Chapter II a more expanded history of the Coast Guard was given. At this point a quick recap of how the Coast Guard came into being is significant, because unlike many federal organizations, the Coast Guard did not begin at any one time, for any single purpose. Today's Coast Guard is a collection of other federal

organizations that no longer exist. The Revenue Cutter Service, forbearer of the Coast Guard, was established originally in the Department of Treasury. Congress authorized the building of the first fleet of 10 cutters. The Service was renamed the Coast Guard in January 1915 when it merged with the Lifesaving Service, which began in 1878. The Lighthouse Service, originally established in 1789, joined the Coast Guard in 1939. Later, the Bureau of Navigation and Steamboat Inspection was permanently transferred to the Coast Guard in 1946. After 177 years in the Treasury Department, the Coast Guard transferred to the newly formed Department of Transportation on April 1, 1967.

C. COAST GUARD MISSIONS

It is interesting to point out that the very creation of the Coast Guard arose from collecting missions from other agencies. This kind of legacy continues into current times. The Coast Guard, consisting of over 39,000 active duty members, the majority of whom are involved to some degree in law enforcement, remains proud of its unique history and the various roles it plays in providing for our national security. Today's missions are as diverse as ever. The listing of missions below helps paint a picture of an organization that has very broad and vital responsibilities:

Aids to Navigation - Promotes safe and efficient passage of marine and air traffic by providing continuous and accurate, all-weather radio-navigation service. Maintains short and long-range aids to navigation such as

lighthouses and buoys. Operates long-range radio-navigation transmitters including Loran and Omega.

Boating Safety - Reduces the risk of loss of life, personal injury and property damage in recreational boating.

Defense Operations - As the hard core about which the Navy forms in time of war, the Coast Guard provides operating units with the combat capability necessary to function effectively as an armed, naval force. In peacetime, Maritime Defense Zone commanders are responsible for coastal defense planning and exercises. In wartime, they conduct port security and U.S. coastal defense operations within 200 miles offshore.

Environmental Response - Minimizes damage from pollutants released in the coastal zone. Reduces threat to the marine environment from potential spills of oil or hazardous substances. Helps develop national and international pollution response plans.

Ice Operations - Promotes maritime transportation in ice-laden polar and domestic waters by providing icebreaking capability for federal and scientific organizations. Keeps domestic shipping routes and ports open year-round to meet the reasonable demands of commerce.

Maritime Law Enforcement - Enforces all federal laws on, under and over the high seas and waters under U.S. jurisdiction. Interdicts drug smugglers and illegal migrants. Enforces fisheries regulations and the Exclusive Economic Zone out to 200 miles at sea, the U.S. continental shelf, and any other U.S. territory or possession.

Marine Inspection - Minimizes deaths, injuries, property loss and environmental damage by developing and enforcing standards and policies for the safe design, construction, maintenance and operation of commercial vessels and offshore facilities. Issues Certificates of Documentation for U.S. flagged vessels engaging in the coastwise, Great Lakes, fishing and registry trades, and endorses documents for recreational vessels.

Marine Licensing - Issues new, renewed and upgraded licenses for officers and seamen. Regulates the manning of commercial vessels, to ensure all vessels are adequately manned with a minimum number of qualified crewmen to safely operate the vessel.

Marine Science - Provides weather and oceanographic services for other Coast Guard programs and federal services.

Port Safety & Security - Safeguards ports, waterways, waterfront facilities, vessels and people working in them, from accidental or intentional damage, disruption, destruction or injury. Manages port safety, port security and environmental protection concerns.

Search and Rescue - Renders aid to people in distress and property in the marine environment. Serves as maritime SAR coordinator within the National SAR Plan. Maintains SAR facilities along U.S. coasts as well as Alaska, Hawaii and the Great Lakes.

Waterways Management - Involves the interrelationship between three entities - ships, waterways and facilities including docks, bridges, and piers.

These individual missions can be classified into four main mission areas which are maritime law enforcement, maritime safety, environmental protection and national security. Within the maritime law enforcement mission area, there are several "sub-missions" - drug interdiction, fisheries enforcement, alien interdiction (AMIO) and recreational boating safety enforcement (RBS) - to name those of primary importance.

It is important to realize the ramifications for Coast Guard units as they strive to be ready to respond to the wide spectrum of missions listed above. Most federal regulatory or law enforcement agencies are organized in such a way as to perform along fairly specific missions. For example the U.S. Customs Service assigns its agents to specific missions like fraud or illegal exportation of technology. So at any given time a Customs agent is primarily concerned with only a single "mission", whereas a member of the Coast Guard is assigned to

a unit that is expected to respond to a wide range of missions on virtually a moment's notice.

The amount of time required for proper training of just one mission is substantial. As a Coast Guard unit attempts to establish valid training programs for each mission, the time constraint becomes a major factor. Time becomes a very limited resource for the unit when one considers that many training requirements are not even mission related per se. For example, underway Officer of the Deck (OOD) and coxswain qualifications are major training undertakings for most units.

D. REGIONAL MISSION DIVERSITY

We have shown that the Coast Guard has organizational responsibility for approximately 12 different assigned missions. The next factor we will look at is the geographic regional mission diversity. As one moves from region to region throughout the Coast Guard's area of responsibility, the importance of each mission shifts. Accordingly, the priorities and emphasis for each mission shifts between geographic region.

There are numerous factors that effect the level of activity for each Coast Guard mission in a particular geographic region. The type and amount of marine resources, the volume of maritime traffic, prevailing weather patterns and commercial fishing needs are just a few of the factors that will differ between regions.


Let's focus briefly on the "big three" law enforcement missions- drug interdiction, alien interdiction and fisheries enforcement. Obviously the volume of fisheries enforcement would be different when comparing the coastal regions of Alaska and Delaware. Or, the alien interdiction effort would be different on the Great Lakes compared to Southern California. Or, the emphasis on drug interdiction will clearly be different in Florida versus Oregon. The point is that the Coast Guard needs to manage their law enforcement missions with ardent consideration for the diversity between geographic regions.

E. ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE

The Coast Guard has designed their organizational structure in a way to meet the challenge of these regionally diverse law enforcement missions. The Coast Guard's organizational structure is depicted below in Figure 4-1:

Figure 4-1 is meant to show the administrative control in general terms between the different levels of the chain of command. The arrows indicate organizational structure, not operational tasking for specific missions. The main point is that there is a possibility of having 4 echelons above you in the chain of command at certain units.

The Atlantic Area Commander is located in New York, NY, while the Pacific Area Commander is in Alameda, CA. Each district is located in a different geographic region, with



command and control responsibilities over units within their district. Here are the locations of each district office:

<u>District</u>	<u>Location</u>
One	Boston, MA
Two	St. Louis, MO
Five	Portsmouth, VA
Seven	Miami, FL
Eight	New Orleans, LA
Nine	Cleveland, OH
Eleven	Long Beach, CA
Thirteen	Seattle, WA
Fourteen	Honolulu, HI
Seventeen	Juneau, AK

The Commandant of the Coast Guard is a four star admiral who is in that position for four years at a time. The area commanders are three star admirals, while each district commander is a one or two star admiral. Area and district commanders normally serve for 2 or 3 years in those positions.

F. COAST GUARD HEADQUARTERS, OPERATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIVISION

The Operational Law Enforcement Division, (G-OLE), is the headquarters program manager for the law enforcement mission. The Coast Guard uses two different methods to manage its missions and units at the headquarters level. Certain divisions at headquarters are designated as program managers, while others are designated as facilities managers. (G-OLE) is not a facility manager for any type of unit, so they must often coordinate law enforcement program requirements with other divisions who are facilities managers. For instance there is a different facility manager for Coast Guard aircraft, cutters and stations. This introduces yet another factor of management difficulty due to competing goals of program managers versus facility managers.

There are 4 branches in (G-OLE). These branches are as follows:

- (G-OLE-1) Plans and Analysis Branch
- (G-OLE-2) Living Marine Resources Branch
- (G-OLE-3) Interdiction Branch
- (G-OLE-4) Standards and Support Branch

The Plans and Analysis Branch, (G-OLE-1), at Coast Guard Headquarters is the sponsor of this research project. (G-OLE-1) has defined the strategic planning problems in the following manner. (CDR R. Goodchild, 1993)

- 1) The communication of ELT mission goals from the program manager is inadequate and untimely.
- 2) The communication of resource requirements for missions from operational commander to program manager is inadequate and untimely.
- 3) In general, the communications linkage is unsatisfactory. (G-OLE-1) has also described symptoms of the above problems in the following way:
 - a) There have been instances of slow response to the Commandant's desire to rebalance among mission areas.
 - b) The pendulum may have swung too far. Some circles outside the Coast Guard believe we have virtually abandoned the drug interdiction mission.
 - c) Congressional budget documents contain estimated workload estimates provided by the program manager. The trend analysis algorithm used in the past has proved inadequate during periods of significant change. Valid operational commander estimates are needed.
 - d) Congress routinely asks for projected workload during review of budget submissions. Valid operational commander estimates are again needed.

G. STRATEGIC PLANNING GOALS


(G-OLE-1) has defined the overall goal for improving the strategic planning process for the law enforcement mission this way: To design a planning and assessment system which improves mission performance through better communications between ELT program managers and the operational commanders.

The following were also identified as "needs" by (G-OLE-1):

- Better process to ensure the timely update of program goals
- Program manager needs annual resource allocation

- Program manager needs operational input for long range requirements
- Program manager & operational commanders need to ensure consistency

Figure 4-2 below shows the flow of information envisioned by (G-CLE-1) for effective strategic planning to occur:



The following are desired characteristics of such a system:

- guidance flows down the chain of command with increasing specificity
- requirements flow up the chain of command

- resources flow down the chain of command
- mission execution performed by operational units
- assessment of mission execution flows up

Furthermore, (G-OLE-1) identified the need to improve its ability to measure the effectiveness of Coast Guard units carrying out the law enforcement mission. Two broad goals were established: 1) The need to link measures of effectiveness (MOEs) with goals and objectives and 2) the need to ensure vertical alignment of goals, objectives and MOEs.

The lines of communication that are displayed in Figure 4-2 indicate an ambitious plan, yet this kind of information flow is necessary to effectively manage the three major law enforcement missions across various geographic regions. Another factor that makes strategic planning difficult is the changing emphasis on different mission areas brought on by political forces and top Coast Guard leadership.

H. POLITICAL INFLUENCES

A good example of political forces causing planning difficulties is happening in the Interdiction Branch, (G-OLE-3). That branch is responsible for developing the Coast Guard's drug interdiction goals, strategies and policies. This branch has had to wait for several months while the Clinton administration works on their new drug control strategy. This situation causes Coast Guard goals and strategies to be delayed, which causes field units to be

frustrated because they are unclear as to the level of emphasis to give to a particular mission. The Interdiction Branch chief gave these remarks on this issue:

The Democrats came into power with the notion that change was needed. The idea was that things were wrong and we need to change them....Earlier this year, in about April of 1993, the administration ordered a Presidential Review Directive, PRD 18. This is a review of Presidential Directive 18 from the previous administration, which is the administration's policy for the nation's counter-drug activities. The review's purpose is to determine the new administration's counter-drug policy. The National Security Council takes the lead in this review process. Every federal law enforcement agency that is concerned with the counter-narcotic mission is also involved in the review. The Coast Guard is heavily involved in the review process. The various proposed changes are always hotly contested. It was a process that should have taken about 6 weeks. It has now been over 6 months and the plan still has not been finalized. When it is finalized, PRD 18 will become PDD 18, which stands for Presidential Decision Directive 18. This will then constitute the administration's policy.

From the policy statement a strategy should be developed. The responsibility for promulgating the national strategy has been with the director of Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). This position was established in 1989 and has been referred to as the "Drug Czar". ONDCP has already developed a draft strategy because they're trying to get ahead of the game. They have a deadline of February 1994 for publication. They have seen how long the PRD 18 process has taken, so they have given the federal agencies an interim strategy that is being staffed at Coast Guard Headquarters right now. This will be an iterative process where we will probably see several versions of the strategy. ONDCP is actually putting the cart before the horse a little bit, because the strategy should follow the policy.

Because of this review process the Coast Guard's counter-narcotics strategy is in a bit of a holding pattern while we wait for some of the more contentious issues to be resolved. These issues for the most part are classified at the secret level or higher. In a very broad sense the issues deal with changes in how we as a nation do business and how do we shift our emphasis and resources. The Coast Guard's budget is being rolled back, so there really is a question of what resources

will the Coast Guard have left to implement a counter-narcotics strategy.

This quote indicates that it is difficult to get mission emphasis clarity when policy review takes so long. This situation makes mission emphasis confusing for Coast Guard middle managers and operating units.

I. CHANGING MISSION EMPHASIS

When a new Commandant takes command of the Coast Guard every 4 years, he often has his own agenda of emphasis. Over the past few years there has been increased emphasis on protection of marine living resources and fisheries enforcement. The current Commandant has wanted to get more balance between the three main law enforcement missions due to perceived shifts in emphasis at the national level between drug enforcement, alien interdiction and fisheries enforcement. To a certain extent he may have been successful in that the annual budget dollars spent on the law enforcement missions have grown closer to one another. These figures reflect the percentages of annual Coast Guard operating expense dollars spent on each mission in FY88 compared to FY94:

	<u>FY88</u>	<u>FY94</u>
Drug Interdiction	23.1%	14.1%
Fisheries Enforcement	5.8%	12.6%
Alien Interdiction	5.1%	9.2%

Thus far we have tried to paint a picture of the various factors that are constraints on those who manage the resources of the Coast Guard. Here is a summary listing of the constraints that we have identified during our research:

- Responsibility for 12 different missions
- Geographic regional mission diversity
- Organizational structure
 - 5 echelons to the chain of command
 - Program manager versus facilities manager aims
- Changing leadership emphasis
- External organizational influences

It is important to be aware of these constraints throughout this thesis because these constraints will not be going away. The nature of the Coast Guard's multi-mission responsibility and the other factors listed above mean that the Coast Guard will always be confronted with changing priorities. These constraints must be hurdled to achieve the strategic communications and planning that (G-OLE-1) envisions.

J. INTERVIEW DATA

The preceding pages of this chapter have mainly been objective descriptions of the missions and structure of the Coast Guard. We have also included some descriptive planning constraints and a strategic planning model that (G-OLE-1) is striving towards. The next section of this chapter deals with

the interview data collected for this research. Approximately 50 interviews were conducted of Coast Guard personnel at all levels and locations of the law enforcement organization. The purpose of the interviews was to identify pertinent issues and constraints so that a survey could be developed to gather additional data.

1. Communications Issues

We start with a quote by the Assistant Division Chief of (G-OLE). One can readily tell that this person has a sincere desire to improve communications between the program manager and the field units.

I have looked at the deficiencies of the way we communicate with the field. High on my agenda is to improve our communication to the field units. The law enforcement conference we had last year was the first attempt to get a definition of the communications problem. We stood up in front of the people last year and told them that communications both up and down the chain of command were inadequate. We were using that conference forum for the first opportunity to discuss alternatives to improve the communications problem. The problem was that once the conference was over we all went back to our jobs and we didn't get closure on some of the issues. However we have done a lot this year in defining the problem. We have tried to push forward on our strategic planning processes.

It is significant to note that top management for the law enforcement mission realizes there is a communications problem. The difficulty is in developing a more constant dialogue. It is a hard task to coordinate and communicate the necessary information to the field so they can make the proper planning decisions.

It is a tough job to be in a position at a prominent Coast Guard unit and have to make planning decisions without a clear picture of what is important. An operations officer at a Coast Guard air station has the responsibility of allocating aircraft hours to various missions. An officer in that position would like to make informed decisions planning his unit's patrols. This becomes more of a guessing game, though, if he is unclear about where to focus the units efforts. This officer is able to look at the data he has on how he used his aircraft last year, but he does not feel like he has been receiving information that would enable him to develop a plan to effectively use his aircraft in the future. The communication breaks down between the global objectives that the Commandant puts out in his vision statement and the need for unit specific targets. The point of the following quote from an operations officer at an air station in the Pacific Area is to show the difficulty he has in planning his future operations based on the current quality of communications:

In my opinion, the level of emphasis comes first from the Commandant's vision. This has been very difficult to translate into exact measures. The Commandant said I want balance. Within a year he was looking at data because he is a total quality type of guy, where he measures performance with data. If mission areas were skewed; for example if aviation units were still putting more flight hours toward enforcement of drug laws and treaties instead of balancing that with fisheries enforcement, he would see that personally and physically with his own eyes and say you're not hearing me. You're not doing what I asked you to do. I think that's just a flat communications problem. The staffs of the program

managers need to have a vehicle to clearly translate vision into program policy and direction. If there is a missing ingredient, the difficulty is that some of the levels of emphasis the Coast Guard has and some of the mission areas we do are a function of legislation. Legislation is a support area; the guys in the legal department in headquarters probably route any legislation that effects programs through various places within headquarters. But it may not trickle down to the program managers in a timely fashion ... The people in program administration may not have clear direction to the operating programs showing them what the new targeted level of effort should be. If there is a disconnect it is between knowledge of what we are doing now compared to what the new goal may be. It has to be very specific, because in aviation every single mission is measured in terms of tenths of flight hours. The real problem is that I have great difficulty deciding how to plan patrols. I think I should be using patrols hours that line up with the Commandant's vision for law enforcement. But like I said earlier it is not real clear how to do that. If the Commandant wants the level of aviation fisheries enforcement to increase, which he did say in his very first year as Commandant, and he looks at the numbers the next year and they didn't change; then he has been frustrated and his message didn't get across. He can go directly to the area commanders because they work for him and can say: 'Hey you're not listening to me'. Then they say: 'Wait a minute, the program manager, (G-OLE) didn't tell me that'. This is the disconnect.

This quote reflects a view of a communications disconnect between the Commandant and (G-OLE). Other interviews in the field indicate that planning is not in fact linked to an understanding of the Commandant's vision for each of the law enforcement missions; rather future planning of operations is based on historical data.

Returning to the Coast Guard Headquarters, we find the Assistant Chief of (G-OLE) expressing a desire improve his divisions communications with the field. He recognizes how constantly law enforcement priorities can change. In fact

people at the headquarters level almost expect the priorities to change. They have grown accustomed to this kind of environment. Here are his remarks on this issue, which reflect his desire for balance between the three main law enforcement missions, the communication of broad mission perspectives and being "in tune" with national concerns:

We want to communicate to the area and district commanders that they have a responsibility to prosecute three missions in support of ELT. But really it is even broader than that. There are environmental regulations, fish & wildlife regulations and marine sanctuary regulations to enforce also. We spend the most time on the big three - alien interdiction, drug interdiction and fisheries enforcement. All we want to communicate to them is the sense we get from the Commandant, Congress and any grass roots organizations about these missions. I don't want to play the missions off against each other. I just want the field to hear the public's sense. I really don't want to encourage the field to assign priorities to the 3 main mission areas. Because they are responsible for enforcing all three. The lower in the food chain you go the more detail will need to be communicated. Broad perspectives need to be communicated at the higher levels. Fiscal year objectives should be communicated from headquarters to the area commands. We should say to them: 'Here's what we see the administration, Congress and the people requiring of us this year'.

Our discussions with the area commands about mission priorities have been real ad hoc. If you look at the Coast Guard's budget as a pie, ELT gets about 30% of the operating expense (OE) money. If we were in a good balance, 10% would be assigned to each of the big 3 ELT missions. Maybe we move between those mission categories based on changes in the environment. Now, the commandant reacts to feedback from Congress and the administration on developing the importance of different things. Drug interdiction, for example, is forecast to be down to about 14% of the ELT resource allocation. I think the commandant feels that percentage reflects the administration's priorities. But we don't want to be in a position of telling the operational commander at the beginning of the year: 'Here are your targets', because that could change tomorrow. AMIO is a perfect example. We have had cutters locked up in Operation Able Manner

since the beginning of the year, so the numbers at the end of the year will probably be skewed towards the AMIO mission. The point is that Able Manner wasn't driven by headquarters; it wasn't driven by any strategic planning. It was a function of having resources available to apply to that mission area. The national demand was such that we had to allocate resources to meet that demand.

This quote shows the concern that headquarters has in improving communications, yet the majority of our interview data with field units indicated no noticeable improvement to date. While the intent of headquarters on this issue is noteworthy, there seems to be difficulty in identifying specific processes which will improve strategic communications.

2. Organizational Structure Issues

Whereas the staff at Headquarters see these changing mission priorities as responses to changing national demand, those stationed in the field may not have the same perception. An officer stationed at a district law enforcement office can be frustrated with the constraints of changing mission priorities and the organizational structure. Here we can see that the organizational structure of the Coast Guard seems to cause difficulties with the flow of communications. This person is in a position where he feels time pressure quite often to complete law enforcement missions. Because of time constraints, he feels it is necessary to bypass the area command staff and deal directly with the headquarters staff. His opinion is that the area staff adds little value to the

substance of a particular policy guidance item. The time crunch is not improved when the perception in the field is that the commandant is making operational decisions himself.

This individual is also feeling pressure in that he wants to be able to give operational units specific guidance pertaining their conduct during a law enforcement mission. In the case of the Haitian embargo, he had to wait up to the last minute to get the information needed. Here again there is a reference to the problems of working through the area command. In this case, it appears that the district staff is frustrated by the organizational structure rather than helped by it. This quote is from an officer at a district law enforcement office:

The Area is in the chain of command, but it is not a very smooth link, because our role and their role is not clearly defined. A lot of times on policy issues we go directly to the commandant. That makes area very angry. I've personally been on phone calls and phone patches with the Chief of Operations in HQ with about 14 other people on the line and the admiral will ask: 'Did you tell Area this?', and I'll say: 'No'. Then I call up area afterwards, after the fact, and they get mad. It is impossible to distinguish between the operational and tactical stuff that area is supposed to do and the policy type stuff the commandant is supposed to do. What has happened in the last year or so is that in the law enforcement arena the commandant personally has driven the decision makers much more to his own office. He personally approves all Statements of No Objection (SNO). Any SNO that needs the commandant's approval goes to the commandant himself. (G-O) can't approve them, (G-OLE) can't approve them, they all go to him. I'm not being critical; that's his choice of running things the way he wants to. But, the spin-off is that his staff is much more interested in the daily minutia than they used to be or should be. You have to take area out of the loop. I could give you a half dozen different examples. Recent ones like the Haitian embargo, Cuban alien migration,

Haitian migrants and Cubans in the Bahamas... The way it is written is that area should be the operational and tactical commander, but it doesn't function very well that way. Area tries, but they are often a day late and a dollar short. In practice area seems to add no value to the process. A perfect example is the recent United Nations Security Council embargo that prohibited the importation of oil into Haiti. We saw this coming; we knew this was going to be signed. We knew this was going to go into effect and we knew we were the logical people to enforce it, because we were already in force around Haiti. We had a standing maritime force around Haiti... The problem was that there were a lot of nuances involved with enforcing this embargo. We did not have enforcement authority, we cannot stop vessels by force, and we can't shoot at them. The sanctions against people breaking this embargo are very limited. It was based on the flag state. A lot of details had to be worked out before we could enforce this thing. For instance, what were we supposed to do when a tanker is sighted heading toward Haiti. Nobody knew what to do, and quite frankly we still are not real clear. Headquarters needs to tell us what to do. We position the ships and the people and provide them with air cover and logistics like we're supposed to. Then they find a tanker; So what do we do? Well, in the whole planning process we knew for a couple of weeks what this resolution was going to say before it went into effect. We worked through area, very frustratingly, and (G-OLE) trying to get some substantive guidance. It's not (G-OLE)'s fault; they can't make up policy, they have to get it from National Security Council and the State Department. They did not get any guidance from these other agencies. Then the embargo went into effect. We had absolutely no written guidance on the street - none. We and area had drafted up a huge operations order, which was essentially worthless. We did this without any significant guidance from the commandant on what we ought to be saying in the OPORDER. We've gotten real good at generating reams of paperwork that don't say much. This is a perfect example of where the commandant never came down and said what he wanted us to do. In fact the way this thing came down is like this...Midnight on a Wednesday before the embargo was to take effect, the Chief of Operations was on the phone with the District Commander. So there is a handful of staff officers listening in on this phone patch where (G-O) tells us what to do. Then we got on the satellite communications to tell the operational units what to do. So we had nothing but verbal guidance and area wasn't even in the loop. That's not the way it should happen.

The point of this quote is to show the difficulty that a district has with the chain of command. On the one hand, they are receiving policy guidance from the program manager at headquarters, while at the same time receiving operational direction from the area commander. Receiving guidance from two different sources when performing major operations is inefficient, and in practice does not work.

3. Strategic Context Issues

This last quote brings out the important point that there is quite often "nuances" involved with law enforcement tasking. It seems that understanding the nuances of a strategy or policy is vital to the proper execution of a mission. We found some evidence that field units did not always receive a clear picture of this type of communication. Here, another district law enforcement staff officer comments on this notion:

I think pretty much, the immediate shake is that we're pretty good on coming to grips with what the policy may be all the way down to the district level, but passing that to the unit level, we may not be so good at. We pass information by voice to the unit commander, followed up with a message giving him guidance in hard copy form. Unfortunately this does not always communicate some of the nuances of the policy. We don't assume that because we sent a message to the C.O., that the guy actually doing the boarding has a handle on the new policy. We get message traffic returned in the form of SITREPS, which is the same thing you guys do; that tends to be a bit sterile, because you don't bitch in hard copy. It would be most effective for us to visit a unit after an operation, and sit down with them in a room and do a debrief. That would be the best way to see if the policy was communicated into an actionable item in the field,

but unfortunately we can't do that due to time and budget constraints.

As we collected our interview data, it gradually became clear that the Coast Guard members stationed in the field really wanted to have more information about a mission than just the tasking. This is consistent with our Chapter III literature review pertaining to strategic commitment. Personnel performing the law enforcement missions felt unable to properly execute a particular mission because they lacked information that was more strategic in nature. Here an enlisted boarding team member stationed on a Pacific Area high endurance cutter describes his frustration:

This last incident we had off of Ensenada with the Chinese, there were 14 of us that lived on that boat 24 hours a day, for the whole 12 days. We never left. You're sleeping on the deck, you've got cockroaches running on you, you can't take showers, and you're eating MREs. The boarding party was holding together as far as morale, and not letting their guard down, but after a while when we weren't getting any information, and the ship was just doing circles in the Pacific, the captain began to get frustrated. We were the on scene commander, but had no idea what direction to give our units. Nobody on the boarding team knew who was making the decisions on this alien matter; we didn't know who to get mad or frustrated at. We knew we were enforcing INS laws, but not where decisions were coming from. All we knew was that the President was in Japan, and the vice-President wasn't going to make a decision until he reviewed the President's policy on immigration. NSC and INS seemed to be making on the spot decisions.

The frustration expressed in this interview is a symptom of lack of understanding of the strategic context. If Coast Guard personnel were apprised of the strategic issues that surround this case, much of this frustration could be avoided.

4. Changing Priorities

The (G-OLE) staff at headquarters was able to articulate how quickly the law enforcement priorities changed for the Coast Guard as a whole. The (G-OLE) staff members we interviewed were quick to point out that they were trying to achieve a dynamic balance between the main 3 law enforcement missions. As stated earlier, they had a good grasp of the factors that shift the Coast Guard's law enforcement emphasis. It is unclear how well the field units understand this notion. This quote from the Assistant Division Chief of (G-OLE) gives insight into the view that those at headquarters have:

We don't like to be event driven. Over the last 6 months during the Chinese alien migration we were continually being given guidance from the top. But we don't want to operate that way for the long haul. I was at an aviation law enforcement conference at Atlantic Area recently. During the course of that conference I was told that the Atlantic Area staff had given the Chinese migrant interdiction mission the highest priority of any law enforcement mission. Only search and rescue cases were given a higher priority. I really almost hate to see that. I hate to have it come out as a precept. The priorities for these law enforcement missions are dynamic. Tomorrow it could be Cuban interdiction. If there was a mass migration from Cuba, we would drop everything and respond to that. That call should be made in the field. We here have a responsibility for providing the resources for the field to do their jobs. We go lobby for the billets, resources and gas for the field to go do the job. We should provide the framework and the policy for the field. Once we have identified the missions the field units are to do, we want them to prioritize them. They are the regional experts. Going through the senior operational commander, we want them to prioritize the missions by specific geographic region. The mission priorities will change from one district to the next. The senior operational commander should have a dialogue with the districts about how the resources will be used. Then I think, we at headquarters should be able to know how the resources will be used.

(G-OLE) wants the field unit echelons to prioritize the law enforcement missions based on the regional expediencies. **We found some uncertainty on the part of field units about what the law enforcement priorities were.** To be sure, field units had a different view of what Headquarters would label a dynamic balance. Many Coast Guard personnel we interviewed were uncertain about law enforcement priorities and therefore had difficulty planning effective patrols or other mission prosecution activities. This comment from a station law enforcement petty officer indicates a certain amount of cynicism about the prioritization of the law enforcement missions:

Mission priority guidance is poor, because it is the mission of the moment for the most part, and usually not tasked in consideration of the other missions. It's like I said, what ever is important to the hierarchy at the moment. Actually I am speaking of the Washington hierarchy. Whether we perceive fish, drugs, or aliens to be the highest priority at the moment, shifts regularly. Are resources are finite, there are no other, and this puts a real crimp in our planning cycle. Let me put it to you this way: headquarters is made up of several program managers. Each program manager has mission and guidance responsibility for each area, but they don't, at least to our way of thinking down here in the trenches, talk to each other when it comes to mission allocation. Everybody expects you to do constantly expanding missions.

5. Policy Timeliness Issue

Field units often feel the effect when various factors act as constraints on the Coast Guard's strategic planning and policy making abilities. The time lag that occurs between strategy formulation at headquarters and tactical action at

the operating units can often be a stumbling block to effective operations. Here is an example of a district law enforcement staff officer who has difficulty putting together consistent guidance to the units under his control:

What's lagging on our part in the district, and I think equates over to headquarters for a lot of the law enforcement missions, is having a current directive that's up to date, so that all policy guidance can be found in one location. For example, right now the Maritime Law Enforcement Manual (MLEM) is being updated, and it has been in revision for years. Right now, we just have a million pieces of paper that should be included in the OPODER, that aren't. You have to be like kind of a pack rat, but the guys in the field have been a little frustrated because our lack of concise direction to them. From district to district, that's kind of the way I think things are happening. Each district law enforcement shop has a lot of say on where they put the emphasis of their enforcement efforts.

6. Planning Issues

We found that patrol boats and stations in particular had difficulty planning effective patrols in light of their uncertainty over priorities. Station officers-in-charge and patrol boat commanding officers do not receive specific tasking like cutters do before they go on a patrol. The result was that certain units were making decisions in somewhat of a vacuum. Here two patrol boat commanding officers comment on this notion:

I think for the most part, the tasking we get is fairly clear. Sometimes though, it's somewhat unrealistic given our resources and operational environment conditions. Particularly with this last year, and the additional missions we were given like migrants, I've felt very resource constrained. From how many hours I have to be underway, to how often they want me to get underway with the short notice time that I received, I've had to make

my own decisions out on patrol about whether to concentrate on a migrant versus a narcotics prosecution. To do one optimally, I've got to make a trade off with the other, and I'm not really sure which one takes priority. For example, last week on patrol, I decided to patrol possible drug trafficking routes instead of known alien migration areas. I'm still not certain this was the right decision.

I pretty much determine mission priorities based on personal preference. For instance the Commercial Fishing Vessel Safety Act regulations are new, so I feel like I should be out enforcing them ... I make up my own schedule. The group actually puts out guidance directing me to get underway a certain amount of hours. This guidance comes out in message format and it is encoded. To tell you the truth, I haven't decoded one of those messages in a about a year and a half. I make up my own schedules. We get underway when I say. We board the boats that I want to board. There is a district instruction on law enforcement planning. Basically, for drug interdiction you conduct random boardings unless you have intelligence and you interdict on standard travel routes. The instruction is very vague and as far as I am concerned, it is non-applicable. If I thought there were very many drugs being smuggled into southern California by pleasure boats and not on tankers or aircraft, then I would do more drug interdiction boardings, but I don't see that happening. The way I see things in this group is that each unit commander does what he thinks he should do... I plan our patrols in 2-3 day shots and I decide on my own what is the priority for a particular patrol.

7. Measures of Effectiveness

The staff in (G-OLE) was very concerned with being able to articulate measures of effectiveness for the law enforcement missions. This is an important topic because a federal agency like the Coast Guard receives funding from Congress for programs based on effectiveness. There is a realization in (G-OLE) that quantitative measures do not tell the whole story of effectiveness for law enforcement missions.

The Assistant (G-OLE) Division Chief tells us his view of this issue:

In general all we have been doing and the way we've managed programs in the past, is to collect trailing data. Then we show how we used stuff, which is purely reactive. There has been no process up until last year when he held our first law enforcement conference. This was when we started a dialogue on looking to the future and what we will need to be doing, instead of just reporting what we did.

People like to take things to the objective level. Nobody wants to stand up and make subjective statements on the value of what they're doing. Congress very specifically asks us to fill in numbers in an equation. They'll ask how many cutter-days per pound of cocaine were achieved. Our attitude here is: we're going to have to 'answer the mail'. But this kind of purely quantitative analysis is meaningless, and it bothers us to do it. When we have been asked by Congress if we are effective, I want us to answer in terms of how well coordinated we are. This is primarily on the drug side of things. We have had significant improvement in our liaisons with the other federal law enforcement agencies. We have tried very specifically not to toot our own horns. We try to show that most interdictions are the result of interagency cooperation. We want the people of the United States to see that there is cooperation taking place at these levels. We spend a lot of time setting up infrastructure to dialogue with other agencies. We realize that human nature often wants to take issues like measuring effectiveness to a simple black and white level.

(G-OLE) primarily focuses on quantitative measures because Congressional inquiries always seem to be framed that way. We would prefer to deal more in qualitative measures of effectiveness, but these kinds of measures don't have credibility on Capitol Hill.

This preoccupation with quantitative measures has filtered out into the field. Some Coast Guard members stationed at operational units are frustrated because resources are taken away from them based on operational commanders inability or unwillingness to consider qualitative measures of effectiveness. A high ranking officer at a unit

with drug interdiction as its main mission describes for us what this is like:

To operate our air intercept system effectively, I know that I need 3 HU-25s on standby in the Caribbean. Lately some of my aircraft are being pulled out for the alien migration interdiction mission. I've got no problem with that. I do have a problem with the way area tries to measure my effectiveness. They look at the hours flown for one of my interceptors that sits on the ground in a readiness status and wonder how come not that many hours are flown. I try to explain to them that I need those intercept aircraft to have a full tank of fuel and a fresh crew. The aircraft act as a deterrent. We have data that tells us there are smuggling flight trying to fly into the Gulf of Mexico within minutes of one of our aircraft going down for emergency repairs. The area just looks at hours flown or seizures for a measure of effectiveness. They don't seem to understand what effectiveness means when it comes to air interdiction.

When operational commanders do not grasp what the realities of mission effectiveness are out in the field, it can result in resources being used ineffectively. We found that a "quota" mentality would begin to creep into the field units if there was only emphasis placed on quantitative data. It seems that an insightful law enforcement strategy takes a back seat to just running up numbers of boardings or seizures. There is no link of a strategy to a particular set of objectives. These remarks from group operations officer and a station law enforcement petty officer are interesting:

The last two years we have put in a pretty hard core law enforcement effort. But, basically the guidance for this increased law enforcement effort was just: 'Get underway and do a lot of boardings.' Basically that's all we do unless we have specific intelligence about somebody coming in with contraband. But you get very little of that kind of information. We just go out and do the mass boarding routine. And this strategy really didn't do anything for us. We didn't get more seizures or more

anything out of this effort. Very rarely do you come up with a cold, 'no-intel' bust. Almost every time there is a seizure it is because of intelligence. I've been involved in 19 drug busts and all of them were intelligence hits.... We did 1,000 boardings last year. We tried to maximize the number of boardings we did last year, and all that can be said of that effort is that we shouldn't have done it.

I was representing our group commander at a recent commanding officers conference held at the district office. The district law enforcement division chief was showing us a chart that had dots strewn all over the district's area of operations. The dots represented boardings done during the past year. He pointed out that the dots were all rather close to the coast line. He then proceeded to basically chastise all of us about this. He told us he wanted us to go further out to sea to conduct our boardings. Well, the reason there are so many more boardings conducted close to the coast is because that is where the boats are. There are very few boats out further to sea. The problem with this 'logic' was that he considered his chart with the dots to be intelligence. It was not intelligence, it was just data. Rather than seeking the unit commanders input on the matter, new tasking came out at the meeting like that. What a waste of our resources.

There is a negative effect on the attitude of field personnel when they sense that the missions they are performing are driven mainly by the need to build data. When this notion is in place, it diverts the field personnel from using their own local knowledge to perform missions they see vital. It seems that the personnel in the field would prefer to understand the strategic reason behind the mission so that they can derive a sense of meaningfulness from their tasks. This quote from a station XPO illustrates this kind of frustration:

You want to know things that I find are not as they should be...Our tasking here now is that...well it seems like emphasis has shifted to living marine resources...to

the extent that they want us to show hours in that area, and they want us to show hours in that area so badly... that the tasking has come down that any time our boat leaves the dock and is underway inside the reef line, we log those hours as ELT-Marine Sanctuaries, no matter what we're doing. So if we're doing a SAR case and then it comes time to fill out the abstract, we claim that as one mission and one sortie for SAR with the associated resource hours. Then we log one sortie for ELT-Marine Sanctuaries because we were operating within a sanctuary area. Now what this does is packs our ELT-Sanctuaries mission hours right up to the top, and in reality it accomplishes absolutely nothing. This is because we are not dedicating any of our resources to enforcing marine sanctuary regulations. Our unit just happened to be in the area; even to the extent that the tasking memo we received directed cutters to log their transit time from the pier out to the sea buoy as ELT-Sanctuaries. I can understand the need to show we are doing something about it. It's just that these hours are empty numbers, it's hollow, it doesn't mean anything....The word has come down to show hours in this area... It's depressing to think we're not actually doing anything. They're telling us the emphasis has shifted, so make it look like we've shifted along with it. At no point have they suggested to us that we should spend more time in the back country of the threatened marine sanctuary areas. The tasking was just to show the numbers.

It is obvious from this quote that commitment to a particular law enforcement mission will diminish when it is evident that operations are based on quantity of hours versus quality of prosecution. This is important for the leaders and managers of the Coast Guard to understand - missions driven purely by numbers have a negative impact on operating morale.

As noted earlier, the demands of Congress or the Executive Branch for quantitative data drives (G-OLE) to focus on numerical standards for measures of effectiveness. The Assistant (G-OLE) Division Chief feels it is important for the lower echelons to have some understanding of the external

influences that steers the Coast Guard's emphasis. There is a sense that field personnel would be able think and behave in line with emerging strategy if they understood the "big picture" better. This quote indicates that feeling.

So it is very important that the area and district staffs have the same sense of these external influences that we in headquarters have. Our job should be to communicate to the lower echelons what those external influences are. There is another important ingredient here also. Let me give you an analogy. If you want someone to do something for you, and you don't coordinate with them ahead of time, and they had no idea that you wanted something, then the opportunity for you to be on target is relatively low. We always try to give people a 'heads up' in advance of some new initiative. It is a coordinated process, then we get back to the conference idea as a way to have a dialogue with the field about these external influences we talked about earlier. Then the operators who have the regional expertise know whether or not an initiative will apply to them. These operating units can then feed information back to their operational commanders about how a certain initiative will affect them. They will also be able to discuss the resource requirements for achieving the particular initiative. The area commanders then should assimilate all this feedback so they can discuss resource requirements for the entire area for the coming year.

From this quote it can be seen that headquarters has a clear vision of the type of strategic communications that should occur, but as noted earlier, there is a lack of clarity when it comes to developing a process to improve communication of the "big picture".

8. Strategic Understanding

One group commander that we interviewed told of receiving mixed messages from his operational commander with regards to the fisheries mission. On the one hand Coast Guard units are expected to enforce pertinent fisheries regulations.

In the meantime units are told not to interfere with fishing vessels too often so as not to disrupt commercial fishermen's ability to make a living. Field commanders need to be in tune with the different shades of a published Coast Guard policy. Here this group commander shares a story relating to a fisheries enforcement incident:

I don't know what district wants from me on fisheries. The other day one of our patrol boats was preparing to do a fisheries boarding on a fishing vessel. The master of the fishing vessel displayed a weapon and did not allow the Coast Guard personnel to board his boat. I notified the district office of the situation and asked if they had any particular guidance. A short while later the district came back wanting to know if I wanted the district office to create a fake SAR call so that we could divert our patrol boat away from the law enforcement incident in progress. I couldn't believe that is what they asked me. Apparently they did not want to have an "incident" on their hands. So, that leaves me wondering just what level of intensity do they want from me in fisheries enforcement. The bottom line is that I get mixed messages about the level of intensity and importance I am to place on the enforcement of fisheries regulations.

Finally we discovered a certain amount of opinion that the law enforcement missions crowded out the opportunities to perform other Coast Guard missions. Field units are having to make decisions about cutting out planned hours for other missions. This indicates that possibly the field commanders are not apprised of the relative priorities of missions. Here an air station operations officer discusses this issue:

Law enforcement takes up a lot of our flight time. There's no doubt about it. To the point where we are often asked to combine missions or even delete missions that we have traditionally flown in an effort to provide

even more law enforcement flight hours. Sometimes that does make me stop and think about the other things we have to do with our aircraft, whether it be logistics support for outlying units or other support missions. I think we've kind of whittled things down to a point now where we've probably got as many law enforcement flights going out of Kodiak as we would really want to fly. If we made any other cuts in any other mission areas, we would start to affect the way we can support other units. For example, we fly a medical flight once a week from Kodiak to Anchorage. That aircraft is normally not filled with medical patients, so it provides a good space availability flight for personnel and their families to get off the island. There have been considerations in cutting flights like that. It's kind of hard to stand up and talk about morale flights compared to law enforcement flights, but I think it is important... D17 (ole) is kind of like a ravenous tiger. Regardless of the number of flight hours you throw at them, they want more.

This chapter has first of all tried to identify some of the many factors that act as constraints on the Coast Guard. Many of these constraints are a part of the nature of the Coast Guard as an organization, while other constraints are indigenous to the environment in which the Coast Guard operates. There is little that can be done about these two types of organizational constraints.

Our interview data sheds light on other issues that constrain the Coast Guard's ability to function effectively. These issues are due to problems in the organization that can be resolved. These themes are important because they can be improved upon by the leaders and managers of the Coast Guard.

One theme relates to the need for useful measures of effectiveness and efficient utilization of resources. Quite

often the interview data revealed that field personnel were aware of law enforcement missions that were being driven by a desire to "pad the numbers" by upper level management. While this type of scenario may be happening across the whole spectrum of the federal government, it is not a healthy trend in the long run. When field personnel who are tasked to perform the various law enforcement missions do not operate with a clear understanding of how their effectiveness is being measured, they lose commitment to the mission.

Closely linked to this theme is the need to improve the clarity of law enforcement mission performance standards and goals. Not only did field personnel struggle to measure their effectiveness, but they were not often clear on the expectations and objectives they were supposed to accomplish. In this regard, the Coast Guard personnel we interviewed were very committed to the Coast Guard's role in law enforcement, but they were unclear as to the "big picture" objectives for a given law enforcement mission.

In general, most personnel that were interviewed were dissatisfied with the timeliness and effectiveness of law enforcement policy coming from above them in the chain of command. Field personnel many times were expected to carry out intricate law enforcement missions without the benefit of current guidance. Even when policy was promulgated in a timely manner, the nuances of certain policies were difficult for field personnel to interpret. Certain field personnel

expressed a desire to give feedback to their chain of command. They wanted to be able to validate which policies worked and which didn't.

Due to the kinds of communications problems that were just discussed, field units often were not clear on the level of emphasis to assign to competing law enforcement missions. Unit commanders and operations personnel were sometimes in a quandary when deciding which law enforcement mission was more important at a given point in time.

Some of the problems that have been discussed can be attributed to the political influences inherent with a federal agency. This is to say that Coast Guard leaders and managers may not be able to develop timely guidance due to politically motivated setbacks. The personnel in (G-OLE) understood this constraint to be the "nature of the beast", whereas field personnel were not as in touch with this issue.

The bottom line of this discussion is to point out that these themes constrict the exchange of ideas which ultimately degrades the Coast Guard's ability to perform strategic planning. Without receiving quality input from the field, (G-OLE) is not going to be able to plan for the future with long term strategically focused goals.

The next chapter takes the interview themes identified in this chapter and puts together a survey to collect larger amounts of data. It will be interesting to see how the qualitative and quantitative data integrate.

V. QUANTITATIVE METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS

A. SURVEY DESIGN

Using themes extracted from our interviews with Headquarters, Area, District, Group, Station, Air Station, WHEC, WMEC, and WPB personnel, we designed a survey (Appendix A) of 33 questions. All but one of the survey questions were grouped into nine constructs for further analysis. These constructs were based on themes and conclusions found in our Chapter IV qualitative analysis. The constructs that were developed based on this qualitative analysis, and the applicable survey questions that apply, will be addressed later in this chapter.

As will be shown below, the survey questions were not ordered numerically by construct. This was done intentionally in the survey design, so that an individual completing a survey would not get into a one answer mode with regards to a particular construct.

Demographic information was included at the top of each survey (Appendix A) which would allow us to analyze survey results for the various echelons within the Coast Guard law enforcement community. This demographic data was also used to gain some insight as to where communications or strategy development and execution might be improved upon as

information flows up and down the chain of command. The response scale to the questions was a five point Likert-type format. On the cover letter that was attached to the survey, recipients were advised to circle the number three for instances in which they were undecided, lacked knowledge on the question, the question was not applicable to their current command, or questions for which they had no comment.

B. SURVEY ADMINISTRATION

To get a statistically significant or valid amount of sample data about the different echelons in the Coast Guard law enforcement chain of command, and yet to keep the data manageable, the survey was sent to Coast Guard units randomly throughout the country, see Table 5-1:

TABLE 5-1
REPRESENTATION OF SURVEYED UNITS COAST GUARD WIDE

Type Unit	C.G. Total	Units Surveyed	Surveys/ Activity	Total
Area	2	2	3	6
District	12	9	2	18
Group	45	39	2	78
Station	156	47	1	47
Air Station	26	21	1	21
WHEC	11	11	2	22
WMEC	37	31	1	31
WPB	83	42	1	42
TOTALS	372	198	---	265

From Table 5-1, 198 total units were surveyed, with a total of 265 surveys being mailed to these activities.

C. STATISTICAL DATA ANALYSIS

Completed surveys were returned by 170 individuals, yielding an overall response rate of 64.2 percent. Table 5-2 provides the complete response data and rates for our survey data:

TABLE 5-2
REPRESENTATION OF COAST GUARD WIDE SURVEY RESULTS

Type Unit	C.G. Total Units	Total Surveys	Respondents	Response %
Area	2	6	2	33.3
District	12	18	12	66.7
Group	45	78	34	43.6
Station	156	47	44	93.6
Air Station	26	21	15	71.4
WHEC	11	22	6	27.3
WMEC	37	31	28	90.3
WPB	83	42	29	69.0

The data from the surveys were manually entered into a data base and analyzed using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software package. Our overall representation of 64.2 percent, and the breakdown percentage representation for the various echelons in the law enforcement community, as represented in Table 5-2, achieved our goal of at least 30% response rate from all levels, with the exception

of WHECs. Based on the numbers of returned surveys, we concluded our results to be representative.

D. DATA REDUCTION

To efficiently analyze the data and as noted above, it was necessary to identify a small number of scaled variables relevant to the research questions. A priori groupings of items were formed based on the foundation of our qualitative analysis. We believed these groupings would aid in developing a model for communications, and strategic development and implementation with respect to Coast Guard law enforcement. The scaled variables that we developed are the same as the construct grouping of themes.

Table 5-3 presents the overall survey results by construct, with the constructs listed by means in ascending order. Review of Table 5-3 indicates a general disagreement that the Coast Guard understands political influence (construct IX), has effective strategic planning (construct VIII) or has effective resource management programs (construct I). It also reveals the most agreement that the Coast Guard's mission priorities are clear (construct II), that performance standards are clear (construct V) and that policy guidance and feedback is effective (construct IV). An overall pattern can be seen in that although Coast Guard personnel scored desired outcome variables high, they scored some of the variables which are inputs to these output variables as low, leaving

room for improvement in the strategy development and implementation process.

TABLE 5-3
CONSTRUCT BY TOTAL SURVEY RESPONDENTS
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS
ASCENDING MEAN ORDERED

CONSTRUCT	MEAN	STD DEV	N
IX	2.74	1.07	170
VIII	2.80	0.75	170
I	2.85	0.78	170
III	3.24	0.75	170
VII	3.27	0.74	170
VI	3.32	0.63	170
IV	3.37	0.72	170
V	3.40	0.64	170
II	3.41	0.59	170

Perhaps of more value at this point is the use of these constructs in developing a model to improve strategic planning and implementation. Reliability coefficients (Cronbach's alpha) were calculated on the scaled variables (constructs) to determine their internal consistency. In all cases the resulting coefficients were sufficiently high to justify the use of the construct in further analysis. Table 5-4 provides the constructs (scaled variables), alpha coefficients, and specific questions in each construct.

TABLE 5-4
CONSTRUCTS, ALPHA COEFFICIENTS, AND SPECIFIC QUESTIONS

I) ADEQUACY, DISTRIBUTION, AND MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
(MOE) OF RESOURCE UTILIZATION (alpha = .51)

Q6. My Coast Guard unit has enough resources to carry out its law enforcement missions effectively.

Q7. Resources are proportionately distributed to Coast Guard operational units based on the magnitude of their missions.

Q22. The Coast Guard has valid measures of effectiveness for its law enforcement missions which are helpful at my unit.

II) MISSION PRIORITY CLARITY/FIT (alpha = .66)

Q8. Law enforcement policy guidance is consistent, and is conveyed uniformly down the chain of command.

Q13. Law enforcement objectives for the Coast Guard fisheries mission are clear for my unit.

Q14. Law enforcement objectives for the Coast Guard counter- narcotics mission are clear for my unit.

Q15. Law enforcement objectives for the Coast Guard AMIO mission are clear for my unit.

Q16. Law enforcement objectives for the Coast Guard RPS mission are clear for my unit.

Q23. Law enforcement missions fit well with the other missions at my Coast Guard unit.

Q27. Coast Guard law enforcement mission objectives can be easily translated into unit action plans.

TABLE 5-4 (continued)
CONSTRUCTS, ALPHA COEFFICIENTS, AND SPECIFIC QUESTIONS

III) POLICY AND GUIDANCE COMMUNICATION (alpha = .74)

Q1. The communication of Coast Guard law enforcement policy to my unit is timely.

Q2. The communication of Coast Guard law enforcement policy to my unit is clear.

Q24. Coast Guard law enforcement objectives are developed and communicated to my unit in a timely manner.

Q33. My unit has been provided tactical intelligence "products" that are useful.

IV) POLICY AND GUIDANCE FEEDBACK (alpha = .65)

Q3. My Coast Guard unit is able to give and receive feedback on law enforcement missions in a timely manner.

Q4. My Coast Guard unit is able to give and receive feedback on law enforcement missions in a clear manner.

Q31. Coast Guard law enforcement program managers provide my unit guidance at the right time to effectively and efficiently carry out ELT mission responsibilities.

V) PERFORMANCE STANDARDS CLARITY (alpha = .49)

Q9. Law enforcement procedures for my Coast Guard unit's fisheries mission are clear.

Q10. Law enforcement procedures for my Coast Guard unit's counter-narcotics mission are clear.

Q11. Law enforcement procedures for my Coast Guard unit's AMIO mission are clear.

Q12. Law enforcement procedures for my Coast Guard unit's RBS mission are clear for.

TABLE 5-4 (continued)
CONSTRUCTS, ALPHA COEFFICIENTS, AND SPECIFIC QUESTIONS

VI) POLICY EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY (alpha = .54)

Q17. Law enforcement procedures are effective in meeting the objectives of the fisheries mission at my unit.

Q18. Law enforcement procedures are effective in meeting the objectives of the counter-narcotics mission at my unit.

Q19. Law enforcement procedures are effective in meeting the objectives of the AMIO mission at my unit.

Q20. Law enforcement procedures are effective in meeting the objectives of the RBS mission at my unit.

VII) LAW ENFORCEMENT GOALS (alpha = .44)

Q25. The Coast Guard's long term goal is to increase its role in federal law enforcement.

Q26. The Coast Guard's long term goal should be to increase its role in federal law enforcement.

VIII) STRATEGIC PLANNING (alpha = .62)

Q28. Long term strategic planning for Coast Guard law enforcement is effective.

Q29. In general, the Coast Guard law enforcement chain of command is more concerned with putting out everyday "fires" than in long term strategic planning.

Q30. The Coast Guard law enforcement chain of command does a good job of re-thinking strategy as the situation demands it.

Q32. The Coast Guard law enforcement community has provided effective strategic intelligence information to my unit.

IX) POLITICAL INFLUENCE (alpha = n/a)

Q21. External influences such as presidential directives, legislative actions, and foreign policy, that affect the development of Coast Guard law enforcement policy, are understood by personnel at my unit.

E. MODEL TO BE INVESTIGATED

Given the available scaled variables and themes from our interviews, combined with our qualitative review, a model to analyze the survey data was developed incorporating the constructs from the survey. Figure 5-1 is a graphical representation of the model.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Policy and Guidance Communication
Policy and Guidance Feedback
Strategic Planning

INTERMEDIATE PROCESS VARIABLES

Adequacy, Distribution and
MOE of Resources
Law Enforcement Goals
Political Influence

OUTCOME VARIABLES

Performance Stds Clarity
Policy Effectiveness and
Efficiency
Mission Priority Clarity
and Fit

Figure 5-1: Model for Strategic Planning and Law Enforcement Organizational Effectiveness

The relationships between the independent, intermediate process, and outcome variables is the primary focus of the survey analysis. This model presents hypothesized relationships between independent, process, and outcome variables as derived from our interviews and the survey

results. The first step in the analysis was to determine whether the survey data support this model using Pearson correlation coefficients to assess the degree of correlation between the variables. After the viability of the model is determined, we can then combine this information with interview themes, descriptive statistics, and our qualitative analysis, to determine how the Coast Guard law enforcement community can improve its strategic planning and implementation process. Relevant statistical differences for a construct by law enforcement demographics and echelons in the chain of command will also be presented.

F. RESULTS

Table 5-5 presents a correlation matrix for the variables (constructs) for the model as outlined above. The upper number in each cell is the correlation coefficient, while the lower number in each cell represents the p value for determining the level of significance in the correlation between two constructs. All correlations are statistically significant ($p < .05$), with the exception of construct seven's interface with most of the other constructs. For this reason construct seven will not be used for further analysis in this model, while all other constructs will be. Actually it is not surprising that this construct would not correlate with the other constructs of the model. For one, it had the lowest alpha score (.44) of any of the constructs. Secondly, and

even more important, the two questions on goals that make up the construct try to measure what "is" versus what "should be"; they can "pull" in the opposite direction. These two questions will be discussed more in detail later in this chapter. These relatively high correlations between the groupings of independent, process, and outcome variables give strong support to the hypothesized model.

TABLE 5-5
CORRELATION MATRIX FOR MODEL VARIABLES

CONS	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX
I	1.0 ---								
II	.43 .000	1.0 ---							
III	.30 .000	.53 .000	1.0 ---						
IV	.23 .002	.52 .000	.60 .000	1.0 ---					
V	.35 .000	.65 .000	.47 .000	.41 .000	1.0 ---				
VI	.35 .000	.49 .000	.42 .000	.31 .000	.63 .000	1.0 ---			
VII	.07 .357	.22 .003	.18 .019	.09 .224	.09 .252	.02 .879	1.0 ---		
VIII	.47 .000	.49 .000	.60 .000	.54 .000	.39 .000	.30 .000	.19 .012	1.0 ---	
IX	.28 .000	.41 .000	.37 .000	.31 .000	.34 .000	.37 .000	.00 .964	.39 .000	1.0 ---

Legend:

- I Adequacy, Distribution, and Measures of Effectiveness of Resource Utilization (Intermediate Process Variable)
- II Mission Priority Clarity/Fit (Outcome Variable)
- III Policy and Guidance Communication (Independent Variable)
- IV Policy and Guidance Feedback (Independent Variable)

- V Performance Standards Clarity (Outcome Variable)
- VI Policy Effectiveness and Efficiency (Outcome Variable)
- VII Law Enforcement Goals (Intermediate Process Variable)
- VIII Strategic Planning (Independent Variable)
- IX Political Influence (Intermediate Process Variable)

G. INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS

Tables 5-6 through 5-8 that follow in this section provide summary results of our statistical analysis, and include the mean, and standard deviation for each of the constructs. These tables will show a comparison of the construct results by Coast Guard unit type, by position classification, and by district. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) will then be run to indicate whether the average answers to these constructs are significantly different by these demographics. The numbers in each cell represent the mean, and standard deviation to each question, with the mean listed over the standard deviation. The three place decimal number under the construct number in the first column, represents the level of significance, or the probability that the averages are statistically the same. These Tables along with the most significant correlation results from Table 5-5 will be used to facilitate discussion and to build upon our qualitative analysis of Chapter IV.

1. Independent Variables

We will first evaluate the most significant relationships from the model presented in Figure 5-1 between the independent variables and the affected intermediate process and outcome variables.

a. *Policy and Guidance Communication (construct III)*

This construct is comprised of four theme questions that ask Coast Guard law enforcement personnel to agree or disagree on a five-point scale with aspects of communications effectiveness. This independent variable, with an average score of 3.24, is most strongly correlated with the intermediate process variable of Political Influence ($r=.37$) and the outcome variable of Mission Priority Clarity/Fit ($r=.53$). Tables 5-6 through 5-8 show a comparison of means and standard deviations of construct III by unit type, by position, and by district. Review of these tables show that the average response by unit type is statistically different at a probability of .995 ($1-.005$), is not statistically different by position, and is statistically different at a probability of .975 ($1-.025$) by district. Airstations, district 11, and district 14 respondents, having average scores of less than 3, tend to disagree that policy and guidance communication is effective, while all other levels tend to agree that it is effective. (The district 14 data is not reliable due to the small sample size of 2 - a larger sample size is necessary to approach the Central Limit Theorem.)

TABLE 5-6
CONSTRUCT BY UNIT TYPE

CONST	WHEC N=6	WMEC N=28	WPB N=29	GRU N=34	STA N=44	AIRST N=15	DIST N=12	AREA N=2
I .091	2.67 0.70	3.04 0.66	2.99 0.75	2.79 0.82	2.93 0.81	2.69 0.67	2.25 0.81	2.33 0.94
II .000	3.48 0.47	3.70 0.38	3.64 0.52	3.39 0.60	3.26 0.54	2.87 0.66	3.44 0.69	3.71 0.40
III .005	3.46 0.46	3.57 0.65	3.41 0.54	3.19 0.78	3.13 0.71	2.60 0.99	3.23 0.81	3.38 0.88
IV .002	3.56 0.40	3.65 0.50	3.43 0.76	3.54 0.65	3.08 0.80	2.91 0.67	3.53 0.59	3.83 0.24
V .002	3.25 0.91	3.58 0.49	3.53 0.43	3.51 0.50	3.43 0.57	2.73 1.10	3.23 0.67	3.25 0.00
VI .006	3.04 0.58	3.54 0.58	3.41 0.48	3.35 0.62	3.36 0.53	2.77 0.92	3.08 0.73	3.50 0.35
VII .819	3.42 0.58	3.27 0.66	3.31 0.77	3.16 0.60	3.31 0.79	3.33 0.86	3.13 0.86	4.00 1.41
VIII .002	2.72 0.61	3.27 0.62	2.85 0.76	2.70 0.77	2.74 0.67	2.22 0.69	2.78 0.87	3.33 0.95
IX .373	2.83 0.98	3.04 1.04	2.76 1.02	2.76 1.02	2.57 1.13	2.27 1.03	3.08 1.24	3.00 1.41

Legend:

- I Adequacy, Distribution, and Measures of Effectiveness of Resource Utilization (Intermediate Process Variable)
- II Mission Priority Clarity/Fit (Outcome Variable)
- III Policy and Guidance Communication (Independent Variable)
- IV Policy and Guidance Feedback (Independent Variable)
- V Performance Standards Clarity (Outcome Variable)
- VI Policy Effectiveness and Efficiency (Outcome Variable)
- VII Law Enforcement Goals (Intermediate Process Variable)
- VIII Strategic Planning (Independent Variable)
- IX Political Influence (Intermediate Process Variable)

TABLE 5-7
CONSTRUCT BY POSITION AT UNIT

CONST	CO/XO/OIC N=67	OPERATIONS N=47	XPO/LEPC N=28
I .566	2.88 0.74	2.76 0.72	2.94 0.88
II .935	3.43 0.62	3.39 0.62	3.39 0.42
III .519	3.14 0.71	3.27 0.82	3.31 0.74
IV .295	3.30 0.71	3.48 0.66	3.23 0.87
V .874	3.39 0.67	3.45 0.67	3.42 0.56
VI .298	3.30 0.63	3.44 0.61	3.23 0.55
VII .340	3.19 0.67	3.28 0.76	3.43 0.84
VIII .458	2.70 0.73	2.86 0.79	2.83 0.63
IX .797	2.66 1.05	2.62 1.07	2.79 1.10

Legend:

- I Adequacy, Distribution, and Measures of Effectiveness of Resource Utilization (Intermediate Process Variable)
- II Mission Priority Clarity/Fit (Outcome Variable)
- III Policy and Guidance Communication (Independent Variable)
- IV Policy and Guidance Feedback (Independent Variable)
- V Performance Standards Clarity (Outcome Variable)
- VI Policy Effectiveness and Efficiency (Outcome Variable)
- VII Law Enforcement Goals (Intermediate Process Variable)
- VIII Strategic Planning (Independent Variable)
- IX Political Influence (Intermediate Process Variable)

TABLE 5-8
CONSTRUCT BY DISTRICT

CONS	D1 N=31	D5 N=29	D7 N=26	D8 N=12	D9 N=16	D11 N=21	D13 N=23	D14 N=2	D17 N=8
I .044	2.85 0.76	2.24 0.88	3.00 0.59	2.69 0.64	3.25 0.74	2.43 0.80	2.90 0.77	2.50 1.18	3.29 0.72
II .003	3.47 0.51	3.35 0.56	3.70 0.44	3.42 0.82	3.47 0.52	3.01 0.55	3.27 0.59	3.29 1.62	3.82 0.36
III .025	3.40 0.58	3.09 0.73	3.56 0.50	3.00 1.10	3.06 0.84	2.86 0.82	3.37 0.67	2.75 1.41	3.47 0.73
IV .002	3.56 0.53	3.32 0.56	3.42 0.72	2.56 0.88	3.50 0.83	3.22 0.62	3.45 0.71	2.83 1.65	3.75 0.75
V .022	3.52 0.40	3.34 0.67	3.71 0.39	3.31 1.01	3.27 0.56	3.05 0.82	3.34 0.67	3.25 0.71	3.75 0.33
VI .018	3.49 0.55	3.21 0.55	3.62 0.51	2.85 0.82	3.20 0.51	3.25 0.80	3.23 0.70	2.88 0.53	3.47 0.31
VII .346	3.29 0.57	3.09 0.81	3.46 0.68	3.54 0.84	3.22 0.75	3.26 0.82	3.09 0.62	4.00 0.00	3.19 0.92
VIII .098	2.98 0.52	2.76 0.79	2.83 0.78	2.58 0.88	2.92 0.95	2.38 0.72	2.80 0.69	2.67 0.47	3.29 0.65
IX .123	2.84 1.07	2.79 1.01	3.15 0.92	2.42 1.24	2.69 1.01	2.33 1.11	2.48 1.16	4.00 0.00	2.88 0.99

Legend:

- I Adequacy, Distribution, and Measures of Effectiveness of Resource Utilization (Intermediate Process Variable)
- II Mission Priority Clarity/Fit (Outcome Variable)
- III Policy and Guidance Communication (Independent Variable)
- IV Policy and Guidance Feedback (Independent Variable)
- V Performance Standards Clarity (Outcome Variable)
- VI Policy Effectiveness and Efficiency (Outcome Variable)
- VII Law Enforcement Goals (Intermediate Process Variable)
- VIII Strategic Planning (Independent Variable)
- IX Political Influence (Intermediate Process Variable)

b. *Policy and Guidance Feedback (construct IV)*

This construct is comprised of three theme questions that ask Coast Guard law enforcement personnel to agree or disagree on a five-point scale with aspects of feedback. This independent variable, with an average score of 3.37, is most strongly correlated with the intermediate process variable of Political Influence ($r=.31$) and the outcome variable of Mission Priority Clarity/Fit ($r=.52$). Tables 5-6 through 5-8 show a comparison of means and standard deviations of construct IV by unit type, by position, and by district. Review of these tables show that the average response by unit type is statistically different at a probability of .998 (1-.002), is not statistically different by position, and is statistically different at a probability of .998 (1-.002) by district. Airstations, district 8, and district 14 respondents, with average scores of less than 3, tend to disagree that policy and guidance feedback is effective, while all other levels tend to agree that it is effective. (The district 14 data is not reliable due to the small sample size of 2 - a larger sample size is necessary to approach the Central Limit Theorem.)

c. *Strategic Planning (construct VIII)*

This construct is comprised of four theme questions that ask Coast Guard law enforcement personnel to agree or disagree on a five-point scale with aspects of the Coast Guard's strategic planning process with respect to law

enforcement. This independent variable, with an average score of 2.90, is most strongly correlated with the intermediate process variable of Adequacy, Distribution, and Measures of Effectiveness of Resource Utilization ($r=.47$) and the outcome variable of Mission Priority Clarity/Fit ($r=.49$). Tables 5-6 through 5-8 show a comparison of means and standard deviations of construct VIII by unit type, by position, and by district. Review of these tables show that the average response by unit type is statistically different at a probability of .998 (1-.002), is not statistically different by position, and is statistically different at a probability of .902 (1-.098) by district. WMECs, district 17, and area respondents, with average scores of greater than 3, tend to agree that strategic planning is effective, while all other levels tend to disagree that it is effective. (The area data is not reliable due to the small sample size of 2 - a larger sample size is necessary to approach the Central Limit Theorem.)

2. Intermediate Process Variables

The next step in our model evaluation is to look at which independent variables have the most significant correlation to the intermediate process variables, and what outcome variables are most highly correlated to the intermediate process variables.

a. Adequacy, Distribution and Measures of Effectiveness of Resource Utilization (construct I)

This construct is comprised of three theme questions that ask Coast Guard law enforcement personnel to agree or disagree on a five-point scale with aspects of resource management. This intermediate process variable, with an average score of 2.85, is most strongly correlated with the independent variable of Strategic Planning ($r=.47$) and the outcome variable of Mission Priority Clarity/Fit ($r=.43$). Tables 5-6 through 5-8 show a comparison of means and standard deviations of construct I by unit type, by position, and by district. Review of these tables show that the average response by unit type is statistically different at a probability of .909 (1-.091), is not statistically different by position, and is statistically different at a probability of .956 (1-.044) by district. Of note here is the fact that WMECs, district 9, and district 17 respondents, with average scores greater than 3, tend to agree that resources are adequate, fairly distributed, and have adequate measures of effectiveness in their utilization, while all other levels tend to disagree.

b. Law Enforcement Goals (construct VII)

This construct is comprised of two questions that ask Coast Guard law enforcement personnel to agree or disagree on a five-point scale with whether the Coast Guard's goal "is", or "should be", to increase its role in federal law

enforcement. From Figure 5-1 and as noted above, this construct does not correlate well with the other constructs of our survey. For this reason its correlations are not included for further discussion. The original intent of these two questions was for consensus mapping purposes, which will be discussed in our conclusions and recommendations chapter. Tables 5-6 through 5-8 show a comparison of means and standard deviations of construct VII by unit type, position, and district. Review of these tables show that the average response is not statistically different by unit type, is not statistically different by position, and is not statistically different by district.

c. Political Influence (construct IX)

This construct is comprised of one theme question that asks Coast Guard law enforcement personnel to agree or disagree on a five-point scale with how well political influences on Coast Guard law enforcement policy are understood at the unit level. This intermediate process variable, with an average score of 2.74, is most strongly correlated with the independent variable of Strategic Planning ($r=.39$) and the outcome variable of Mission Priority Clarity/Fit ($r=.41$). Tables 5-6 through 5-8 show a comparison of means and standard deviations of construct IX by unit type, by position, and by district. Review of these tables show that the average response is not statistically different (significance level = .373) by unit type, is not statistically

different (significance level = .797) by position, and is not statistically different (significance level = .123) by district. As would be expected on this question, and with only a few exceptions, most levels on this question indicate that external political influences that affect the development of Coast Guard law enforcement, are not understood at the unit level.

3. Outcome Variables

Our last step is to evaluate those independent and intermediate process variables that correlate most significantly to the outcome variables.

a. Performance Standards Clarity (construct V)

This construct is comprised of four theme questions that ask Coast Guard law enforcement personnel to agree or disagree on a five-point scale with aspects of performing four of the Coast Guard's prime law enforcement missions. This outcome variable, with an average score of 3.40, is most strongly correlated with the intermediate process variable of Adequacy, Distribution and Measures of Effectiveness of Resource Utilization ($r=.35$) and the independent variable of Policy and Guidance Communication ($r=.47$). Tables 5-6 through 5-8 show a comparison of means and standard deviations of construct V by unit type, by position, and by district. Review of these tables show that the average response by unit type is statistically different at a probability of .998 (1-.002), is not statistically different by position, and is

statistically different at a probability of .978 (1-.022) by district. Of note here is the fact that, even though there is statistical difference to these constructs by unit type and district, all levels show a tendency to agree that law enforcement performance standards are clear with the exception of airstations. Their average score was 2.73.

b. *Policy Effectiveness and Efficiency (construct VI)*

This construct is comprised of four theme questions that ask Coast Guard law enforcement personnel to agree or disagree on a five-point scale with whether current procedures are effective in meeting law enforcement objectives. This outcome variable, with an average score of 3.32, is most strongly correlated with the intermediate process variable of Political Influence ($r=.37$) and the independent variable of Policy and Guidance Communication ($r=.42$). Tables 5-6 through 5-8 show a comparison of means and standard deviations of construct VI by unit type, by position, and by district. Review of these tables show that the average response by unit type is statistically different at a probability of .994 (1-.006), is not statistically different by position, and is statistically different at a probability of .982 (1-.018) by district. Airstations, district 8, and district 14 respondents, with average scores of less than 3, tend to disagree that Coast Guard law enforcement policies are effective and efficient, while all other levels tend to agree that these policies are effective and efficient. (The

district 14 data is not reliable due to the small sample size of 2 - a larger sample size is necessary to approach the Central Limit Theorem.)

c. *Mission Priority Clarity/Fit (construct II)*

This construct is comprised of seven theme questions that ask Coast Guard law enforcement personnel to agree or disagree on a five-point scale with aspects of mission priority clarity and how well law enforcement missions fit with other unit missions. This outcome variable, with an average score of 3.41, is most strongly correlated with the intermediate process variable of Adequacy, Distribution and Measures of Effectiveness of Resource Utilization ($r=.43$) and the independent variable of Policy and Guidance Communication ($r=.53$). Tables 5-6 through 5-8 show a comparison of means and standard deviations of construct II by unit type, by position, and by district. Review of these tables show that the average response by unit type is statistically different at a probability of 1.0 ($1-.000$), is not statistically different by position, and is statistically different at a probability of .997 ($1-.003$) by district. Airstation respondents, with an average score of less than 3, tend to disagree that Coast Guard law enforcement priorities are clear and fit well with other missions, while all other levels tend to agree that law enforcement priorities are clear and fit well with other missions at the unit level.

H. OVERALL SURVEY RESULTS BY QUESTION

Appendix B presents the overall survey results by question, with the questions listed by means in ascending order; this data will be referenced in our conclusions and recommendations chapter.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. FINDINGS BY MODEL

The analysis of our hypothesized model from Figure 5-1 with the constructs that we developed, provide some useful insight for developing a strategic planning and implementation model.

What these results indicate is that the effectiveness of policy and guidance communication and policy and guidance feedback will have a definite impact on the degree to which political influences are understood at the operating level, and more importantly, how clear mission priorities will be for operational commanders - the relationships are direct. The results also indicate that the more effective strategic planning is, the more effective resource management will be, and again the clearer mission priorities will be for the unit commanders. Finally, the results indicate that for law enforcement performance standards to be clear, resource management and policy and guidance communications must be effective; also that effective and efficient policy is dependent most heavily on effective policy and guidance communication.

The overall purpose for developing relationships in this model is for use in continuous process improvement in the strategic planning and implementation process for Coast Guard

law enforcement. Perhaps these relationships come as no surprise to an experienced manager, but they do emphasize the relationship between these variables so as to provide insight for strategic planning and management decision purposes.

B. FINDINGS BY DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS

1. By Unit Type

Other interesting insights were developed from our quantitative analysis of Chapter V. We see that when we analyzed our construct variables by type of unit, there were statistically different answers to all constructs with the exception of the intermediate process variables of political influence and goals. Since there were statistical differences in all three independent variables, which have a direct effect on the desired outcome variables, care should be exercised to improve these independent variables across all unit types, so as to achieve a more uniform strategic planning and implementation process throughout the Coast Guard law enforcement community. Based on our qualitative analysis, we attribute these statistical differences to the fact that different unit types receive different emphasis on their input variables, which has a direct affect on their output performance variables. For example, larger cutters expressed higher satisfaction with communications, feedback and the strategic planning process, and therefore also expressed higher satisfaction with performance standards clarity, policy

effectiveness and efficiency, and mission priority clarity and fit.

2. By Position

When we analyzed our construct variables by position, there were no statistical differences in answers based on position held at unit. This lends some integrity to our other statistically different data in that the cover letter to the survey, which was signed by Coast Guard Headquarters, stated that the answers to the survey "should reflect the understanding your command or organizational level has with respect to law enforcement issues." We believe the respondents followed this advice, and passed these surveys to the "individual" who could respond best to these broad law enforcement issues. Our sample respondents represented a broad spectrum from senior petty officers to commanding officers, with no statistical differences based on position held. When looking at ways to improve strategic planning and implementation, this indicates relative position in an organization is not a critical factor to consider.

3. By District

When we analyzed our construct variables by district, there again were statistically different answers to all constructs with the exception of the intermediate process variables of political influence and goals. Since there were statistical differences in all three independent variables, which have a direct effect on the desired outcome variables,

care should be exercised to improve these independent variables across all districts, so as to achieve a more uniform strategic planning and implementation process throughout the Coast Guard law enforcement community. We attribute these statistical differences to variable law enforcement emphasis from region to region, based on regional significance to a particular law enforcement mission.

C. FINDINGS BY CONSTRUCT

1. General Findings

Table 5-3 showed the overall results to this survey by construct and indicated that the constructs of political influence, strategic planning and resource management all scored below the average score of three Coast Guard wide, with all other constructs scoring above three. Strategic planning is the one independent variable of these three. We have noted previously its relationship to political influence being understood at the operating level and on effective resource management. We therefore recommend management priority be to improve the strategic planning process. Effective resource management and political influence being understood should follow an improvement to the strategic planning and implementation process.

2. Cutters Versus Shore Units

Referring to Table 5-6 we find that the survey responses for the cutters (WHECs, WMECs & WPBs) are higher

than the shore based operational units (Groups, Stations & Air Stations) for constructs II and III. Construct II pertained to mission priority clarity while construct III had to do with policy guidance and communication. This quantitative data reinforces what we learned from interviews of Coast Guard personnel assigned to ships versus shore units. These interviews revealed that larger cutters received more explicit guidance by means of pre-patrol briefings, operational orders and real-time message traffic updates. This led to greater satisfaction by these units with regards to their outcome performance variables.

Most personnel assigned to cutters that we spoke with felt they received good guidance from their operational commander about what was important for them to achieve on a particular patrol. We recall one WMEC commanding officer saying he received almost hourly mission guidance updates via message traffic while on patrol. Cutters often receive pre-patrol briefings and follow guidelines from a patrol operations order (OPORDER).

Meanwhile the operational shore units did not speak of receiving the same type of guidance. Personnel at this type of unit often spoke of not being clear of what was most important or not knowing what was expected of their unit. Unit personnel felt uncomfortable setting priorities on their own.

We recommend that (G-OLE) focus on the communication of law enforcement objectives and priorities to shore units along the same lines as they do with cutters. Floyd pointed out in our Chapter III literature review that top management needs to provide strategic context for middle managers and get them involved in strategic decisions.

D. FINDINGS BY QUESTION

1. Measures of Effectiveness

In our Chapter IV qualitative review we spoke of (G-OLE-1) wanting to improve its ability to measure the effectiveness of Coast Guard units carrying out the law enforcement mission. Coast Guard personnel gave their opinions about what they felt was often inefficient use of resources. Appendix B showed the overall results to this survey by question. With this in mind, it is not really surprising that the survey question with the lowest mean response score was question number 22, which read: "The Coast Guard has valid measures of effectiveness for its law enforcement missions which are helpful at my unit." Not only was this the lowest scoring question on this survey, but it was also the only significant jump in the continuum of average responses to all questions. Seven other questions scored below the average of three, but these are better analyzed by data reduction of questions into constructs, as shown above in paragraph C.

We then draw the conclusion that (G-OLE) needs to receive a clearer assessment of what is actually taking place in the field during mission execution. It appears that there is a communications breakdown between the field units and Headquarters regarding this kind of data. The words of guidance from our Chapter III literature review would seem to provide a good conceptual framework to improve the communications needed for better measures of effectiveness: for strategy, the tendency is to think exclusively in terms of top management, but this presumes they fully comprehend the situation and know what needs to be done. In complex or changing environments, individuals rarely appreciate all the intricacies of this situation, and organizations benefit from the variety of viewpoints represented by middle and operating level managers. Unless they understand the strategic context, however, lower-level managers are unable to recognize significant events, offer sound advice, or propose good options.

It is very difficult to apply quantitative measures of effectiveness for many of the law enforcement missions performed by the Coast Guard, as well as other law enforcement agencies. What aggravates many field personnel is what they perceive as non-meaningful measures of effectiveness being applied to their law enforcement performance goals; to improve measures of effectiveness used in the law enforcement community will first require the commitment from (G-OLE) to

retrieve and evaluate a qualitative assessment by field units of how well policy is translated into mission execution. Providing feedback to the field units will enlighten their strategic context and hopefully spur on a continually improving communications loop.

2. Fisheries Mission

The following data is taken from Appendix B:

<u>Law Enforcement Objectives</u>		<u>Performance Standards</u>
Fisheries	Q13 - 3.17	Q9 - 3.08
AMIO	Q15 - 3.41	Q11 - 3.22
Drugs	Q14 - 3.58	Q10 - 3.56
RBS	Q16 - 3.70	Q12 - 3.75

One can see from this data that the fisheries mission scored the lowest for the two sets of survey questions pertaining to law enforcement objectives and performance standards. This would seem to indicate that the fisheries mission may be most unclear of the law enforcement missions.

During some of our interviews Coast Guard personnel spoke of the difficulty they had in staying abreast of the various fishing regulations. In particular small shore units felt that the complexity and volume of fishing regulations was a full time job in itself. Many smaller units developed liaisons with state and federal fisheries agencies to stay on top of the current enforcement strategy. We recommend a consolidated, streamlined training program be instituted using videotapes or tele-conferences as the primary communications medium.

3. Strategic Planning

One other significant recommendation here deals with question number twenty-nine. Although this question scored relatively high Coast Guard wide with an average of 3.55, what this tells us is that there is a general tendency to agree that the Coast Guard law enforcement chain of command is more concerned with putting out everyday "fires" than in long term strategic planning. We believe this result speaks for itself and points to the need for an improved strategic planning process that is proactive in nature.

E. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

All of our findings seem to demonstrate a lack of strategic understanding on the part of many field units. We wish to stress that we observed high levels of commitment to all the law enforcement missions by Coast Guard personnel during our field interviews. We are encouraged by the genuine desire we found in (G-OLE) to improve communications of strategic context to the field. From our Chapter III literature review, we found that Coast Guard law enforcement personnel were highly committed, yet lacked strategic understanding. Based on Floyd and Wooldridge's research, we deduce that these personnel generally fall into the "blind devotion" category. If the Coast Guard can improve its strategic understanding processes, these personnel would shift into the "strong consensus" category. It is important for

Coast Guard leaders and managers to realize that problems with consensus are causes of poor strategy implementation. The following are ways to improve strategic consensus:

- Stimulate continuous participation in the planning process from all those who are capable of contributing.
- Translate strategic analysis into meaningful terms among peers.
- Commit to achieve strategic objectives by translating aspirational goals into objectives which enable measurement.
- Highlight the importance of strategic thinking in the organization by rewarding strategic thinking and removing fear of penalization.

Furthermore, in Figures 3-5, 3-6 and 3-7, Reid gives specific guidance on operationalizing the strategic planning process.

We also recommend that personnel attending upcoming law enforcement conferences brainstorm ideas about how to stimulate continuous participation in the planning process. Research shows that high levels of shared understanding are built from direct exposure to strategic priorities. Ideas could be developed to promote this kind of exposure for the operational units. Future research could be done to develop more definitive means of achieving appropriate permeation of strategic planning into operational units.

F. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Survey response was excellent on the part of all Coast Guard personnel receiving this survey. It provided a diverse

data base by district, by unit type, and by position. This obviously shows a great deal of concern and professionalism by the Coast Guard law enforcement community. Twenty four surveys were received after the date we used to cut off our data base (N=170). This would have provided a response rate of over 70%. Due to the profound interest by Coast Guard Headquarters and by all law enforcement field personnel, we recommend further and more definitive research into the following areas:

- 1) Development of qualitative measures of effectiveness for Coast Guard law enforcement.
- 2) Development of specific tools and ways to improve law enforcement strategic communication.
- 3) Examining other law enforcement agencies to determine the applicability of their strategic planning processes to the Coast Guard law enforcement community.

APPENDIX A

COAST GUARD LAW ENFORCEMENT SURVEY

Please circle the appropriate demographic category listed below:

Type of unit: WHEC WMEC WTB GROUP SARSTA AIRSTA DISTRICT

District in which unit is located/homeported_____

Position: CO XO OINC XPO OPS LEPO OTHER_____

Years of service_____

The following statements are about Coast Guard law enforcement and the experiences you have had in your current assignment. Please use the following scale to show how much you agree or disagree with each statement; circle number 3 if you feel a statement is not applicable to your unit.

1. The communication of Coast Guard law enforcement policy to my unit is timely. 1 2 3 4 5
2. The communication of Coast Guard law enforcement policy to my unit is clear. 1 2 3 4 5
3. My Coast Guard unit is able to give and receive feedback on law enforcement missions in a timely manner. 1 2 3 4 5
4. My Coast Guard unit is able to give and receive feedback on law enforcement missions in a clear manner. 1 2 3 4 5
5. One of the Coast Guard's major concerns is losing law enforcement mission and budget dollars. 1 2 3 4 5
6. My Coast Guard unit has enough resources to carry out its law enforcement missions effectively. 1 2 3 4 5
7. Resources are proportionately distributed to Coast Guard operational units based on the magnitude of their missions. 1 2 3 4 5
8. Law enforcement policy guidance is consistent, and is conveyed uniformly down the chain of command. 1 2 3 4 5
9. Law enforcement procedures for my Coast Guard unit's fisheries mission are clear. 1 2 3 4 5
10. Law enforcement procedures for my Coast Guard unit's counter-narcotics mission are clear. 1 2 3 4 5
11. Law enforcement procedures for my Coast Guard unit's AMIO mission are clear. 1 2 3 4 5
12. Law enforcement procedures for my Coast Guard unit's RBS mission are clear. 1 2 3 4 5
13. Law enforcement objectives for the Coast Guard fisheries mission are clear for my unit. 1 2 3 4 5
14. Law enforcement objectives for the Coast Guard counter-narcotics mission are clear for my unit. 1 2 3 4 5
15. Law enforcement objectives for the Coast Guard AMIO mission are clear for my unit. 1 2 3 4 5
16. Law enforcement objectives for the Coast Guard RBS mission are clear for my unit. 1 2 3 4 5

- | | |
|--|-----------|
| 17. Law enforcement procedures are effective in meeting the objectives of the fisheries mission at my unit. | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 18. Law enforcement procedures are effective in meeting the objectives of the counter-narcotics mission at my unit. | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 19. Law enforcement procedures are effective in meeting the objectives of the AMIO mission at my unit. | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 20. Law enforcement procedures are effective in meeting the objectives of the RBS mission at my unit. | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 21. External influences such as presidential directives, legislative actions, and foreign policy, that affect the development of Coast Guard law enforcement policy, are understood by the personnel at my unit. | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 22. The Coast Guard has valid measures of effectiveness for its law enforcement missions which are helpful at my unit. | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 23. Law enforcement missions fit well with the other missions at my Coast Guard unit. | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 24. Coast Guard law enforcement objectives are developed and communicated to my unit in a timely manner. | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 25. The Coast Guard's long term goal is to increase its role in federal law enforcement. | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 26. The Coast Guard's long term goal should be to increase its role in federal law enforcement. | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 27. Coast Guard law enforcement mission objectives can be easily translated into unit action plans. | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 28. Long term strategic planning for Coast Guard law enforcement is effective. | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 29. In general, the Coast Guard law enforcement chain of command is more concerned with putting out everyday "fires" than in long term strategic planning. | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| 30. The Coast Guard law enforcement chain of command does a good job of re-thinking strategy as the situation demands it. | 1 2 3 4 5 |

31. Coast Guard law enforcement program managers provide my unit guidance at the right time to effectively and efficiently carry out ELT mission responsibilities. 1 2 3 4 5

32. The Coast Guard law enforcement community has provided effective strategic intelligence information to my unit. 1 2 3 4 5

33. My unit has been provided tactical intelligence "products" that are useful. 1 2 3 4 5

APPENDIX B
QUESTION BY TOTAL SURVEY RESPONDENTS
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS
ASCENDING MEAN ORDERED

QUESTION	MEAN	STD DEV	N
Q22	2.31	1.03	170
Q32	2.71	1.12	170
Q21	2.74	1.07	170
Q28	2.78	0.90	170
Q7	2.82	1.07	170
Q33	2.88	1.07	170
Q30	2.92	0.96	170
Q8	2.99	1.09	170
Q31	3.01	0.95	170
Q5	3.07	1.14	170
Q9	3.08	1.19	170
Q17	3.09	1.07	170
Q25	3.15	0.80	170
Q13	3.17	1.16	170
Q24	3.22	0.95	170
Q11	3.22	1.05	170
Q19	3.22	0.96	170
Q18	3.22	1.00	170
Q27	3.27	0.96	170
Q2	3.39	0.98	170
Q26	3.40	1.03	170
Q6	3.41	1.18	170
Q15	3.41	1.04	170
Q3	3.43	1.01	170
Q1	3.46	1.00	170
Q29	3.55	1.04	170
Q10	3.56	0.88	170

APPENDIX B (continued)
 QUESTION BY TOTAL SURVEY RESPONDENTS
 MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS
 ASCENDING MEAN ORDERED

QUESTION	MEAN	STD DEV	N
Q14	3.58	0.98	170
Q4	3.67	0.84	170
Q16	3.70	0.92	170
Q20	3.73	0.87	170
Q12	3.75	0.91	170
Q23	3.78	1.02	170

LIST OF REFERENCES

Brigham, Lawson W., "The U.S. Coast Guard in 1991", Naval Institute Proceedings, Volume 118, No. 5, May 1992, pp. 157-163.

Dess, G. G., "Environment, Structure, and Consensus in Strategy Formulation: Conceptual Integration", Academy of Management Review, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1987, p. 317.

Floyd, S. W., and W. Wooldridge, "Managing Strategic Consensus: The Foundation of Effective Implementation", Academy of Management Executive, Vol. 6, No. 4, 1992, p. 27-38.

Floyd, S. W., and W. Wooldridge, "Middle Management Involvement: in Strategy and its Association with Strategic Type", Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 13, 1992, p. 154.

Floyd, S. W., and W. Wooldridge, "The Strategy Process, Middle Management Involvement, and Organizational Performance", Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 11, 1990, p. 240.

Guth, W. D., "Strategy Implementation Versus Middle Management Self-Interest", Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 7, 1986, p. 314.

Hall, James B., A Management Information System for Coast Guard Law Enforcement, Master Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, December 1981.

Kouzes, James M., The Leadership Challenge, Jossey-Bass, 1987.

Nielson, R. P., "Toward a Method of Building Consensus During Strategic Planning", Sloan Management Review, Fall, 1981, pp. 29-40.

Noanka, I., "Toward Middle-Up-Down Management: Accelerating Information Creation", Sloan Management Review, Spring, 1988, p. 15.

Reid, D. M., "Operationalizing Strategic Planning", Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 10, 1989, p. 556-557.

Sink, D. Scott, "Developing Measurement Systems for World Class Competition", 1991.

Tichy, Noel M., Control Your Own Destiny or Someone Else Will, Currency Doubleday, 1993.

U.S. Department of Transportation, Coast Guard Roles and Missions Study, April 1982, p. 117.

U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. Coast Guard, Enforcement of Laws and Treaties FY 82-91, Operating Plan (1979), p. IV-1.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

	<u>No. Copies</u>
1. Defense Technical Information Center Cameron Station Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145	2
2. Library, Code 52 Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943-5002	2
3. Professor Frank Barrett, AS/Br Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943-5000	2
4. Professor Gail Fann Thomas, AS/Fa Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943-5000	2
5. LCDR Jeffrey Holmgren 1009 Leahy Rd. Monterey, CA 93940	2
6. LT James Dolan 127 Sidesaddle Lane Jacksonville, NC 28546	2
7. U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters 2100 Second Street, S.W. Washington, DC 20593-0001 ATTN: (G-OLE)	2